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Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5:
Empirical Analysis and
Behavioral Implications
Dain C. Donelson † & Robert A. Prentice ‡
Abstract
Pleading requirements are the keys to the courthouse. Nowhere is
this more true than with rule 10b-5 class action securities fraud claims.
Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
impose special pleading burdens upon plaintiffs regarding the scienter
element and bar them from discovery when defendants file a motion to
dismiss. This Article begins with a doctrinal history of the scienter
element of a rule 10b-5 claim that indicates that many key legal
questions remain unsettled and that application of legal rules to specific
factual allegations regarding a particular type of defendant—external
auditors—is extraordinarily muddled. To determine whether the
impression arising from this extensive but nonsystematic examination
of the case law is accurate, we also empirically examine rule 10b-5
claims against auditors and confirm that few facts are consistently
viewed by the courts as indicating the presence (or absence) of scienter.
This lack of clarity in the law and its application makes it difficult for
either plaintiffs or defendants to evaluate the settlement value of
claims. Furthermore, the law’s excessive vagueness affords judges
virtually untrammeled discretion. The literature of behavioral psychology
and related fields indicates that excessive discretion exacerbates problems
that arise from unconscious judicial bias.
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Introduction
Many important and contentious issues surround private class
action securities fraud lawsuits under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 1 Pleading requirements “are the
key that opens access to courts” 2 for these and other lawsuits, yet the
law in this area has long been and continues to be best described as
“muddled.” 3 The confused state of the law is more than just theoretically important because empirical studies of differential pleading
standards among the circuits in rule 10b-5 cases indicate that certain of
these differences strongly affect both dismissal rates 4 and the types of
1.

This Article takes no position on the question of whether such lawsuits
are generally good or bad. Certainly, many believe they are damaging to
the economy and serve no good end. See, e.g., Evaluating S. 1551: The
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 216–22 (2009) (statement of Adam C.
Pritchard, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School) (arguing
that private class actions move a lot of money around, but add little to
deterrence at the margin); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 55, 84 (1991)
(arguing that attorneys are the principal beneficiaries of this litigation).
Others have found evidence of benefits flowing from active private
antifraud litigation. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice,
Law and Corporate Finance 182 (2007) (reporting results of
empirical study finding, among other things, that “in the securities law
enforcement context, it is the private right of action and not government
prosecution which has the greatest financial value”); Howell E. Jackson &
Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. Fin. Econ. 207, 237 (2009) (finding that
key positive financial outcomes such as stock market capitalization,
trading volumes, and number of IPOs correlate with private
enforcement—but also with public enforcement—of securities laws); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in
Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1, 27–28 (2006) (finding various benefits
flowing from active private enforcement of public securities laws); Justin
Hopkins, Does Shareholder Litigation Affect Financial Reporting Choices?
4–5 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1872068 (finding that a court decision that reduced the risk of
shareholder litigation led to more financial restatements and earnings
management, especially among firms facing a higher risk of litigation).

2.

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).

3.

Ann Morales Olazábal & Patricia Sanchez Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed:
A Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 401, 412
(2008) (noting the “muddled quality of the jurisprudence in this area”).

4.

See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 913, 937, 976 (finding that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act affected dismissal rates, and that the
stringency of the pleading standard applied by a particular circuit was
especially impactful); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as
Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private
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cases that are filed, effectively screening out cases with smaller claim
amounts. 5
Similar confusion reigns in an important strand of these cases that
is the primary focus of this Article—those section 10(b)/rule 10b-5
claims brought against external auditors. Pervasive confusion is not
terribly unusual in the case law generated by federal securities litigation,6
but neither is it a good thing. A doctrinal analysis of courts’ scienter
decisions in these rule 10b-5 auditor cases highlights the existence of
these many important and contentious issues but does little to resolve
them. A primary purpose of this Article is to determine whether or
not empirical analysis can shed some light on these issues and, if so,
help to clarify the pragmatic contours of the all-important scienter
requirement in private federal securities fraud litigation.
In a narrow but important area, this Article addresses two of the
most important balancing acts in the law. How can plaintiffs be granted
adequate access to the courthouse without unduly burdening defendants with frivolous litigation? And how can judges be allowed adequate
discretion to dispose quickly of unpromising claims without giving them
untrammeled discretion to advance their own unconscious biases?
Part I of this Article undertakes a traditional historical and
doctrinal analysis of the statutory and case-based development of the
law of scienter in rule 10b-5 litigation. It provides background and
context, addressing the scienter issue generally, but also focusing on
the case law involving auditor defendants specifically. Part II reports
the methods and results of an empirical analysis of the scienterrelated case law in rule 10b-5 litigation against external auditors.
Both the doctrinal and the empirical analyses indicate that the law of
pleading scienter against external auditors in rule 10b-5 cases is so
vague and inconsistent that, as a practical matter, judges have virtually
unfettered discretion to reach any conclusion they deem appropriate.
Using the insights of behavioral psychology and related fields, Part III
analyzes the unfortunate implications of such nearly limitless discretion.
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 125,
142 (2005) (finding that different pleading standards among circuits
affected motion to dismiss outcomes).
5.

Perino, supra note 4, at 916–17 (noting that stricter pleading standards
may cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to focus on cases with higher damages).

6.

See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the
Name of Securities Regulation, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 143, 179
(2010) (noting “unnecessary confusion about the definition of
materiality”); Ferry Eden Lopez, Comment, At a Loss with Loss
Causation: Resolving the Ninth Circuit’s Loss Causation Decisions in
Metzler Investment GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges and In re Gilead
Sciences, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1737, 1743 n.24 (2010) (noting
evidence of confusion over what constitutes loss causation, even after
latest Supreme Court case on the issue).
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I. A History of the Scienter Requirement,
Especially as Regards Auditor Defendants
A.
1.

The Early Questions

Is section 10(b) a scienter-based or negligence-based statute?

Section 10(b) 7 forbids securities fraud in violation of SEC rules,
such as rule 10b-5. 8 The role of scienter in rule 10b-5 cases has been
filled with controversial questions over the years and remains so. The
initial question was whether Section 10(b) is a scienter-based or
negligence-based statute. Some lower courts initially held that
negligence alone could violate the statute, 9 while other courts strongly
7.

Section 10(b) reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).

8.

Rule 10b-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).

9.

See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963)
(“[T]he statute was meant to cover more than deliberately and
dishonestly misrepresenting or omitting material facts . . . .”); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (disagreeing with the assertion
that the plaintiff must prove “genuine fraud” instead of “a mere
misstatement or omission”).
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disagreed. 10 That issue, at least (and, perhaps, at most) is now firmly
settled. In 1976, the Supreme Court established in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are intent-based liability
provisions. 11
2.

Is recklessness sufficient to satisfy the scienter standard?

Hochfelder left open an immediate, critical question that remains
unsettled nearly forty years later. 12 The Supreme Court has at least
thrice reserved without deciding the issue of whether recklessness
suffices to satisfy the scienter standard. 13
If the Supreme Court ever rules on this issue, it should embrace
the recklessness standard for at least three reasons. First, for more
than three decades the lower courts have been virtually unanimous in
holding that recklessness suffices. 14 Second, the common law of fraud
has long recognized recklessness as sufficient to satisfy the scienter
10.

See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (requiring
more than “simple negligence not involving some fraudulent purpose or
species of scienter”); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d
Cir. 1973) (“[P]roof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth is
necessary to establish liability under Rule 10b-5.”).

11.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Relying upon
legislative history and principles of statutory interpretation, the Court
concluded in Hochfelder, a case involving an auditor defendant, that
“[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and
deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances—the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing—and when its history
reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the
scope of the statute to negligent conduct.” Id. at 214.

12.

Hochfelder also left unsettled the question of whether the scienter
requirement applied in SEC actions as well. The Supreme Court quickly
held that it did. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980) (“[T]he
Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of a civil
enforcement action to enjoin violations of [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5].”).

13.

See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323–
24 (2011) (assuming without deciding that the “deliberate recklessness”
standard applied by the lower court was sufficient to establish scienter);
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3
(2007) (noting that courts of appeals have differed in the degree of
recklessness required and that “[t]he question whether and when
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement is not presented in this
case”); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (“In certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here
the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).

14.

See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and
Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class
Action, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003, 1026 (1998) (“[A]ll Circuits that have
considered the issue have held that recklessness suffices . . . .”).
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requirement, 15 and section 10(b) was enacted to strengthen, not weaken,
investor protection as compared to the common law. 16 Third, in 1995
15.

See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024
(6th Cir. 1979) (“At common law, recklessness satisfied the scienter
requirement for fraud.” (citing Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337
(H.L.) 374 (appeal taken from Eng.))); Restatement of Torts
§ 526(b) cmt. e (1938) (“[A] misrepresentation . . . is fraudulent if [the
maker] is conscious that he has merely a belief in its existence and
recognizes that there is a chance, more or less great, that the fact may
not be as it is represented.”); William L. Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts § 107, at 701 (4th ed. 1971) (noting “general
agreement” that intent is present when there is “reckless disregard” for
the truth).

16.

Section 10(b) is based on the common law of fraud. See Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981)
(noting that rule 10b-5 claims are derived from the common law deceit
action), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375
(1983); Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1975)
(“[C]ommon law fraud concepts underlie the securities laws and provide
guidance as to their reach and application . . . .”); P. Schoenfeld Asset
Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (D.N.J. 2001)
(noting that, although the tort is statutory in origin, it is grounded in
common law fraud and deceit); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp.
2d 354, 368 (D.N.J 1999) (noting that even though the tort is statutory
in origin, it stems from the common law of fraud). The Supreme Court
often accesses the common law for guidance regarding the meaning of
section 10(b). See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341
(2005) (noting that courts have implied a private damages action that
resembles a common law tort action); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 231, 244 n.22 (1988) (noting that statutory actions were designed
to add to the common law protections provided to investors); Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)
(commenting that “rigid common-law barriers” have been avoided when
construing securities laws); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
227–28 (1980) (“At common law, misrepresentation made for the
purpose of inducing reliance upon [a] false statement is fraudulent.”).
Significantly, section 10(b) was meant to strengthen, not weaken
that common law protection. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that section 10(b) should be
interpreted so as to liberalize the common law in order to effectuate its
remedial purpose). The Supreme Court has agreed, holding as an
example that “[a] fundamental purpose” of the federal securities laws,
including section 10(b), was to replace the common law fraud regime’s
caveat emptor rule in order “to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
Regarding auditors, Congress replaced the very protective state
common-law Ultramares view that auditors could not be liable for
negligence to third parties unless those third parties were named in the
engagement letter, with the broad negligence liability of section 11 of the
1933 Act, which makes auditors potentially liable to all investors in a
public offering if the auditors cannot prove their due diligence. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (listing auditors and
other experts as statutory defendants in lawsuits where false statements
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Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
which contains liability provisions premised upon the existence of
recklessness-based section 10(b) liability. 17 Enactment of provisions
that have no meaning without recklessness-based liability surely
signals congressional approval of that liability. 18
3.

What form of recklessness is required to satisfy
the scienter requirement?

Most lower courts have concluded that for recklessness to suffice,
it must be nearer true scienter than to gross negligence on the
negligence → gross negligence → recklessness → scienter continuum.19
Lower courts commonly require not just recklessness, but “severe”
recklessness. 20

in registration statements injure investors); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
174 N.E. 441, 444–45 (N.Y. 1931) (adopting the privity view of auditors’
third-party liability for negligence). See generally John Hanna & Edgar
Turlington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities Exchange Act,
21 Va. L. Rev. 251, 279 (1935) (“It is certainly safer now for the man
who wishes through his savings to obtain a stake in corporate property
in this country than it was before the [1934] Act was passed.”).
17.

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA adopted proportionate,
rather than joint and several, liability for defendants who are not found
to have knowingly violated the securities laws. In other words,
defendants with actual intent remain jointly and severally liable while
defendants who are only reckless benefit from being only proportionately
liable (although this protection is limited by two exceptions involving
“uncollectible shares” stemming from the existence of insolvent codefendants). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2006).

18.

See Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does it Have a Future After
Stoneridge?, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 351, 356 (claiming that Congress’s
enactment of proportionate liability “would have been completely
pointless if a private right to sue multiple defendants did not exist”).

19.

See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199 (1st Cir.
1999) (describing the distinction between recklessness and negligence as
“not just a difference in degree, but also in kind”); Reiger v. Price
Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2000)
(“[N]o degree of negligence can satisfy the substantive element of
scienter, or raise a strong inference of scienter . . . .”).

20.

For instance, the 11th Circuit has held that “severe recklessness” meets
the scienter standard, noting that
[s]evere recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable
omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple
or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of it.
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B.

The PSLRA’s Role

Although Hochfelder and succeeding lower-court cases established
a high standard of liability, Silicon Valley high-tech firms and large
accounting firms believed that they were the victims of too many
frivolous class action securities fraud lawsuits pursuant to rule 10b-5
and other federal securities law provisions. 21 Their lobbying procured
the 1995 enactment of the PSLRA, 22 a massively pro-defendant
reform provision. 23 For current purposes, the most significant features
of the PSLRA were its heightened pleading requirement, especially for
the scienter element, 24 and its provision that the filing of a motion to
dismiss on grounds of failure to adequately plead scienter (or other
elements) stays discovery and therefore may prevent plaintiffs from
procuring evidence to support their claims. 25
After the PSLRA, notice pleading was out, replaced by a
requirement that any complaint pursuant to rule 10b-5 satisfy two
specificity obstacles. Plaintiffs must “specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” 26 And civil
damage plaintiffs also must “state with particularity facts giving rise

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 n.18 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809,
814 (11th Cir. 1989)).
According to some courts, “[t]his level of recklessness requires that
defendants make statements that they know, or have access to
information suggesting, are materially inaccurate.” Ferris, Baker Watts,
Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing
Advanced Data Concepts v. Navarre Corp. (In re Navarre Corp. Sec.
Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 746 (8th Cir. 2002)).
21.

Other provisions targeted by the PSLRA include sections 11 and 12 of
the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2006).

22.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

23.

The PSLRA, among other things, replaced joint and several liability
with proportional liability, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2006); recognized a
statutory “bespeaks caution” defense, § 78u-5(c)(1); heightened loss
causation proof requirements, § 78u-4(b)(4); and created stricter
damages rules, § 78u-4(e).

24.

§ 78u-4(b)(2).

25.

§ 78u-4(b)(3)(B).

26.

§ 78u-4(b)(1).
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to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.” 27
The PSLRA set a precedent. In 2007 and 2009, in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly 28 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 29 the Supreme Court raised
the pleading bar across all federal court cases by requiring plaintiffs to
articulate a “plausible” basis for their claims, even before they can use
discovery to seek support for them. 30 The PSLRA also raised several
questions.
1.

How strict is the pleading standard under the PSLRA?

Because the facts that give rise to a strong inference of scienter
must be alleged with particularity, many courts hold that plaintiffs
must plead “the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph
of any newspaper story.” 31 Put another way, a complaint “must (1)
specify the statements that . . . were fraudulent, (2) identify the
speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4)
explain why the statements were fraudulent.” 32 Other courts,
however, hold that plaintiffs “need not . . . plead the ‘date, place or
time’ of the fraud, so long as they use an ‘alternative means of
injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their
allegations of fraud.’” 33 And some of these courts have cautioned

27.

§ 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). See generally Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc.
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the
heightened pleading standard Congress enacted as part of the PSLRA);
Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 654
(8th Cir. 2001) (same).

28.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

29.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

30.

Allegations of acts that are “merely consistent” with a defendant’s
liability fails to cross the important threshold between possibility and
plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. “The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

31.

In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)).

32.

ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir.
2007); see also In re MRU Holdings Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 500,
508 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying the four requirements of the complaint).

33.

Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp.,
742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)); P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v.
Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 604 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting the
same text from Rolo).
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against requiring plaintiffs to plead with too much precision issues
that defendants may have concealed. 34
These disagreements are critical because, as noted above, the
PSLRA’s discovery stay, which goes into effect upon the filing of any
motion to dismiss, can make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
obtain the necessary factual details required by most courts in order
to successfully plead scienter. 35 A strict scienter pleading standard can
create a very significant roadblock to a plaintiff’s prosecution of a rule
10b-5 claim.
2.

What is a “strong inference”?

The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead scienter with sufficient
particularity to establish a “strong inference” that the intent
requirement is met, but the lower courts could not agree on the
meaning of a “strong inference.” 36 The Supreme Court attempted to
settle the issue in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., where
it held that a court’s responsibility in applying the PSLRA pleading
standard
is not to scrutinize each allegation in isolation but to assess all
the allegations holistically. In sum, the reviewing court must
ask: When the allegations are accepted as true and taken
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference? 37
34.

See, e.g., Rolo, 155 F.3d at 658 (“Courts should, however, apply the rule
with some flexibility and should not require plaintiffs to plead issues that
may have been concealed by the defendants.” (citing Christidis v. First Pa.
Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1983))); Schoenfeld, 142 F.
Supp. 2d at 604 (quoting the same text from Rolo).

35.

See Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under
the Radar, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 802, 816 (arguing that the
PSLRA’s “tightened pleading standards and bar on discovery,” coupled
with other factors, will cause underdeterrence of fraud); Hillary A. Sale,
Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of
the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims,
76 Wash. U. L. Rev. 537, 578 (1998) (“[W]hen vigorously applied,
the combination of a strict pleading standard with a stay of discovery
creates a pleading barrier so high that few complaints will survive it.”
(emphasis added)).

36.

Paul A. Griffin & Joseph A. Grundfest, When Does Insider Selling Support
a “Strong Inference” of Fraud?, 9 Asia-Pac. J. Acct. & Econ. 159, 160
(2002) (“There is substantial disagreement within the judiciary over the
proper legal interpretation of this ‘strong inference’ standard.”).

37.

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). This strict approach is generally
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Iqbal and Twombly that
to survive motions to dismiss complaints must contain sufficient factual
information that, if accepted as true (as they must be) would state a
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Given a potential range of competing inferences, the Court essentially ruled that a “tie goes to the plaintiff,” for an inference of scienter
need not be stronger than competing inferences for the complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss; it need only be just as strong.38 As
indicated, the Court also demanded a holistic, rather than merely a
piecemeal, examination of the evidence. 39
3.

How does a plaintiff properly plead and prove scienter?

Another and more significant issue that predated the PSLRA but
became even more contentious after its passage regards how a plaintiff
properly pleads and proves scienter. Many lower courts had
previously developed two primary means for plaintiffs to prove that a
defendant acted with requisite scienter. One involved proof of motive
and opportunity while the other involved the use of circumstantial
evidence. These remain the two primary ways of establishing scienter
in the wake of the PSLRA, at least according to many courts. 40
claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial
plausibility is achieved when plaintiffs plead factual details that allow
courts to draw reasonable inferences that defendant is liable for the
alleged conduct. Id.
38.

Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access
Barriers to Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 55, 56 (2012) (“Tellabs did not eliminate the use of circumstantial evidence in pleading, but rather held that when two inferences are
equally plausible, the tie goes to the plaintiff.”).

39.

See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326 (“[T]he court’s job is not to scrutinize each
allegation in isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically.”).
Victor Quintanilla argued that Tellabs, by “broaden[ing] the epistemic
goal of decision-making by requiring federal courts to compare and
contrast culpable and non-culpable explanations for behavior” will have
laudable effects. Victor D. Quintanilla, (Mis)Judging Intent: The
Fundamental Attribution Error in Federal Securities Law, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Bus. 195, 245 (2010). But Victoria Su surveyed the case law and
suggested that the “holistic” approach suggested by the Court in Tellabs
simply gives the circuit courts sufficient latitude to simultaneously
pretend to follow Tellabs and yet retain their pre-Tellabs tests for
scienter. See Victoria Su, Note, Scienter After Tellabs, 5 Brook. J.
Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 527, 547 (2011) (discussing various courts’
adjustments in the wake of Tellabs).

40.

“In the Second Circuit, [at least,] a ‘strong inference’ of scienter can be
established by alleging facts either ‘(1) showing that the defendants had
both motive and opportunity to commit the [alleged] fraud or (2)
constituting strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness.’” In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting ATSI Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing the two alternatives for establishing a “strong inference”); In
re Agape Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 298, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (same).
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a.

Motive and Opportunity

Motive 41 and opportunity can be established by plaintiffs alleging
facts indicating that defendant benefitted in a “concrete and personal
way” 42 from the alleged fraud. 43 Motives that would be common to all
actors in the defendants’ position will not suffice. 44 Thus, if plaintiffs
plead merely that corporate insiders manipulated the numbers because
they wished to maintain a high market price for their company’s stock,
that would not suffice, even though it would certainly be reasonable to
believe that defendants would wish to achieve that goal, because almost
all insiders would have that same motivation. 45 In other words, this
allegation would not help distinguish the motives of fraudsters from the
motives of all corporate insiders. 46
41.

Intent and motive are related, but separate. Intent refers to the state of
mind with which an act is committed, whereas motive is what prompts
the person to act. See Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L.
Econ. & Pol’y 801, 809 (2012).

42.

Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000).

43.

See id. (“Motive would entail concrete benefits that could be realized by
one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures
alleged.” (quoting Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130)); Wilson v. Dalene, 699 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Motive and opportunity can be
established by demonstrating that defendants benefitted ‘in a concrete
and personal way’ from the alleged fraud.” (quoting Trinity BUI v.
Indus. Enters. of Am., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 364, 370 (S.D.N.Y 2009)));
In re DRDGOLD Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (discussing requirements for an allegation of motive); Queen Uno
Ltd. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo.
1998) (adopting an approach where plaintiffs, in order to prove a strong
inference of fraudulent intent, can plead both motive and opportunity).

44.

See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Motives that are
generally possessed by most corporate directors and officers do not
suffice.”); In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258,
293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (containing similar language); Wilson, 699 F. Supp.
2d at 559 (same); In re DRDGOLD, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (same).

45.

See Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139 (“Insufficient motives, we have held, can
include (1) the desire for the corporation to appear profitable and (2) the
desire to keep stock prices high to increase officer compensation.” (citing
Novak, 216 F.3d at 307–08)); Wilson, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (discussing
insufficient corporate motives); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Research
Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).

46.

Insider trading by individual defendants is often deemed to satisfy the
motive requirement, but only if it is unusual in amount or otherwise
suspicious. See Avon Pension Fund v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 343 Fed.
App’x 671, 673 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“[U]nusual insider
trading activity during the class period may permit an inference of bad
faith and scienter . . . .” (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d
47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995))); In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d
379, 390 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that insider trading may support an
inference of scienter if unusual and suspicious); Greebel v. FTP
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b.

Circumstantial Evidence

The second primary means of alleging scienter involves circumstantial evidence that points to more than mere negligence by
defendants. 47 It is difficult to read a person’s mind, so circumstantial
evidence is the key to proof, or lack thereof, in most types of fraud
litigation. 48 Securities fraud cases are no different. The Supreme Court
itself has observed that “the proof of scienter required in fraud cases
is often a matter of inference from circumstantial evidence.” 49 That
said, catch-all or blanket allegations will not meet the particularity
requirement. 50 But circumstantial evidence can pile up so as to render
incredible a non-fraudulent explanation.
C.

Scienter and Outside Auditors

The focus of this Article is the scienter requirement as applied to
rule 10b-5 claims against external auditors. It is clear that the scienter
requirement does not demand that auditor defendants desire to injure
people, but only that they be able to foresee that certifying misleading
financial statements that do not conform to GAAP (generally accepted
accounting practices) can influence and thereby injure investors. 51
Beyond that, not much is settled.
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197–98 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Unusual trading
or trading at suspicious times or in suspicious amounts by corporate
insiders has long been recognized as probative of scienter.”).
47.

Fact finders tend to strongly prefer direct evidence over circumstantial
evidence, even though their prejudice against circumstantial evidence is
arguably unwarranted and their reliance on direct evidence may
overvalue its trustworthiness. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir et al., Seeing is
Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias 3–4, (Apr. 21, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989561 (“Commentators generally agree that the prejudice against circumstantial evidence is
unwarranted. . . . Factfinders tend to undervalue the reliability and
probative value of circumstantial evidence, . . . and to overvalue the
trustworthiness and weight of direct evidence, such as eyewitness
testimonies.” (citations omitted)).

48.

See Clarke v. United States, 132 F.2d 538, 540–41 (9th Cir. 1943) (“It is
rare when direct proof of the devising of the scheme may be given. In
most cases it must be inferred.”).

49.

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983).

50.

See, e.g., Advanced Data Concepts v. Navarre Corp. (In re Navarre
Corp. Sec. Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e disregard ‘catchall’ or ‘blanket’ assertions that do not live up to the particularity
requirements of the statute.” (quoting Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001))).

51.

See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 221 (2d
Cir. 2000) (finding requisite scienter based on foreseeability of harm to
investors); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the AUSA decision).
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1.
a.

Should outside auditors receive special treatment
in application of the scienter standard?

Existence of Special Treatment for Auditors

To protect auditors from liability, lower courts are often
especially demanding of plaintiffs attempting to plead fraud against
auditors. 52 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has stated that “the
meaning of recklessness in securities fraud cases is especially stringent
when the claim is brought against an outside auditor.” 53 Therefore,
according to some courts, liability attaches in a rule 10b-5 case only
when the auditor acts with “at least deliberate recklessness.” 54 Other
courts say that auditors’ wrongdoing must “approximate an actual
intent” to aid the client’s fraud in order to satisfy the recklessness
standard. 55 Others require that the evidence clearly show that the
52.

In the Second Circuit, courts tend to say that the scienter pleading
requirement for auditors is “demanding.” See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros.
Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The
standard for evaluating assertions of an auditor’s scienter . . . is
demanding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re IMAX Sec.
Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The standard for
pleading auditor scienter is demanding.”); In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec.
Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The standard for
pleading auditor scienter is demanding.” (quoting In re Refco, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))). It is “more exacting”
than the standard for other securities fraud defendants. In re Fannie
Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

53.

PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d
505, 514 (S.D. Ohio 2000)). Much more than a simple audit failure is
required for the auditor to be liable. “It is well-settled that violations of
GAAP and GAAS, standing alone, do not create an inference of
scienter, much less a strong one.” Id. at 694 (citing In re Comshare, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 1999)).

54.

See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“The PSLRA requires, to repeat, that [plaintiff] state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of the required state
of mind, i.e., at least deliberate recklessness.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (1997))); Kelley v. Rambus, Inc., 384 Fed. App’x 570, 573 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“Kelley’s claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fail to
sufficiently allege ‘particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of
deliberate recklessness.’” (quoting In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
979)); In re Verifone Holdings Sec. Litig., No. C 07-6140 MHP, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24964, at *18–21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (explaining
the plaintiff’s burden).

55.

See, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (“For
‘recklessness on the part of a non-fiduciary accountant’ to satisfy
securities fraud scienter . . . [‘i]t must, in fact, approximate an actual
intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company.’”
(quoting Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 120–21 (2d
Cir. 1982))); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. KPMG LLP, 822 F.
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auditor either aided the fraud or was so egregiously irresponsible that
no other accountant would have acted in the same manner. 56 Still
other courts have held that when the recklessness standard for auditors
is combined with the stringent PSLRA pleading provisions, “a simple
rule emerges: to allege that an independent accountant or auditor
acted with scienter, the complaint must allege specific facts showing
that the deficiencies in the audit were so severe that they strongly
suggest that the auditor must have been aware of the corporation’s
fraud.” 57 These approaches nearly eliminate recklessness as a basis of
auditor liability, although it is unanimously recognized by lower
courts as sufficient for all other rule 10b-5 defendants.
The special treatment provided to auditors is generally accepted,
with Professor Coffee going so far as to opine that auditors have
“virtual immunity” under federal securities laws. 58 Perhaps the
strongest evidence that auditors are subject to special treatment is the
fact that auditors are rarely named as defendants in securities class
actions, even when their clients are accused of accounting fraud. 59
Supp. 2d 711, 721 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (noting that recklessness must
approximate intent to establish scienter); Lehman Bros., 799 F. Supp.
2d at 302 (same); Fannie Mae, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (same).
56.

See, e.g., PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 693–94 (“The [plaintiff] must prove
that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted
to no audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to
investigate the doubtful, or that the accounting judgments which were
made were such that no reasonable accountant would have made the
same decisions if confronted with the same facts.” (quoting Miller v.
Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th
Cir. 1994))); La. Mun. Police, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (quoting PR
Diamonds).

57.

SmarTalk, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (emphasis added) (citing Hollinger v.
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)); see
also PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 694 (quoting SmarTalk); In re Crocs,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1154 (Colo. 2011) (same).

58.

John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1550
(2006). While the PSLRA accorded securities fraud defendants special
protection, the wave of Enron-era scandals soon followed and many
thought that enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745, in 2002 might shift things dramatically back in the
other direction. But a recent study indicates that auditor liability risk
after 2002 has actually decreased. See Ross D. Fuerman, Auditors and
the Post-2002 Litigation Environment, 24 Res. Acct. Reg. 40, 44
(2012) (“Analysis of 1169 lawsuits filed between 2001 and 2008 found
that auditor litigation severity decreased after 2002. . . . Thus, there
appears to have occurred, after 2002, a reduction in auditor liability
risk, compared to the 2001–2002 period.”).

59.

For instance, Cornerstone Research finds that auditors were named at
an annual rate of only 1%–6% of securities class action cases between
2006 and 2010, while GAAP violations were alleged in 26%–57% of
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b.

Rationale for Special Treatment for Auditors

This differential treatment of auditors is not justified by any
language in section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. Nor is it supported by any
policy considerations contained in the ’34 Act’s legislative history. 60
The Supreme Court has not issued any rulings that would directly
justify this differentiation. Nor do the PSLRA’s provisions or legislative
history provide any clear support for a differential treatment of auditors
regarding the pleading of scienter, although the impact of many of its
provisions was very kind to them.61
cases. Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings:
2010 Year In Review 32 fig.29 (2011), available at http://securities.
stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2010_YIR/Cornerstone_Research
_Filings_2010_YIR.pdf. Similar results were obtained in earlier time
periods as well. E.g., Ross D. Fuerman, Auditors and the Post-Litigation
Reform Act Environment, 14 Res. Acct. Reg. 213 (2000) (“[A]uditors
are named defendants in a lower percentage of class actions in 1998 than
in previous years . . . .”).
60.

While the PSLRA’s scienter pleading requirements nowhere distinguish
between corporate defendants and accountants, courts have imposed
clear distinctions. See Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since
the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, in Securities
Litigation & Enforcement Institute 2005, at 17, 62–63 (PLI Law
& Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1505, 2005) (discussing
scienter pleading requirements with respect to accountants); Gideon
Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the
PSLRA, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1097, 1175–76 (2007) (“Some of the district
court opinions have all but foreclosed the possibility that plaintiffs could
ever successfully plead scienter of an external auditor based on motive
and opportunity.”). At least one court agrees. See In re AOL Time
Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 239 n.49
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Ernst & Young’s protestations notwithstanding, Rule
9(b) does not contemplate a higher standard for pleading fraud by an
independent auditor than for pleading fraud by any other 10(b)
defendant.”). Some courts have resisted creating a two-tiered standard
that favors auditors. See, e.g., N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst &
Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his Court has
previously advised against developing ‘separate[ ] rules of thumb for each
type of scienter allegation.’” (quoting S. Ferry LP, # 2 v. Killinger, 542
F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008))).

61.

Although GAAP violations are generally featured in a significant
portion of securities fraud class actions (e.g., 44% in 2005 and 68% in
2006), from 1995 to 2006 auditors were named as defendants in just
8.4% of such suits. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among
Big Four Auditors, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1682 (2006).
These developments occurred parallel to a diminished emphasis by
the SEC on monitoring of accounting firms that lasted until SarbanesOxley was enacted in 2002. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused
Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
Cornell L. Rev. 269, 290 (2004) (“[F]rom some point in the 1980s
until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away from
actions against the Big Five accounting firms towards other priorities.”);
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The grounds for being especially solicitous of external auditors are
typically unexplained even in court opinions that explicitly grant this
extra protection. One reason some courts have given to justify special
treatment for auditors is the notion that “there are limits to the scope
of liability for failure adequately to monitor the allegedly fraudulent
behavior of others.” 62 Although these differential standards for outside
auditors may be defended as generally consistent with a special
solicitousness that the Supreme Court has exhibited for secondary
actors in securities fraud cases, the rationale is also undermined by
these same cases. While it might once have been seriously argued that
auditors had to worry about facing liability for failing to adequately
monitor their clients’ fraudulent conduct, today they can be liable for
rule 10b-5 civil damages only for making false statements themselves.
The 1994 Central Bank case eliminated any auditor civil damage
liability for aiding and abetting clients’ fraud. 63 The 2008 Stoneridge
case held that auditors cannot be liable even for their own fraudulent
statements that helped fool third parties if investors did not rely
directly upon those fraudulent statements. 64 And, most recently,
Janus Capital held that a defendant’s (including presumably an
outsider auditor’s) own fraudulent statements cannot be actionable
unless that defendant’s fraudulent activities were known to investors
at the time they made their investment decisions. 65
Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing:
Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 Fla. St. L. Rev. 17, 60 (2003)
(“Although the [SEC] . . . [has] the formal authority to discipline
accountants, that authority is rarely exercised.”); Cassell Bryan-Low,
SEC May Take Tougher Stance on Accountants in Audit Failures,
Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 2002, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB103973735
229267033.html (“During the past 25 years, the SEC has sued large
accounting firms fewer than 10 times for audit failures . . . .”); see also
A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 19, 54 (2006) (“Under the PSLRA, defendants who are
only tangentially involved in the fraud will not face potentially bankrupting liability, so accountants do not have to serve as quasi-guarantors
for the solvency of their clients.”).
62.

Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000). Because Central
Bank, Stoneridge, and Janus Capital make it clear that auditors cannot
be liable under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 for simply failing to adequately monitor the frauds of others, this rationale is less persuasive.

63.

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 184, 188–89 (1994).

64.

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
166–67 (2008).

65.

Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2302 (2011). Between the Supreme Court and the PSLRA, external
auditors are already receiving substantial protection from liability,
which mitigates any need to accord them special scienter protection. On
the other hand, the audit firms can respond that notwithstanding these
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A second rationale for giving auditors special protection from
securities liability is based primarily upon the assumptions that (a)
auditors are rational actors and (b) a short-term profit earned by
looking the other way while a client commits fraud would be
outweighed by the profits auditors can gain by maintaining a good
reputation. 66 Although there are persuasive reasons to doubt both of
these assumptions, 67 courts have continued to apply them without ever
addressing the substantial body of evidence that undermines them. 68
cases, they still face SEC civil and Department of Justice criminal
liability for aiding and abetting fraud and for making fraudulent
statements from the shadows. They could argue that this liability is
enough to motivate them to act properly, even though they are specially
protected from liability in private damage actions. Whatever the merits
of this debate, most courts grant auditors special protection when scienter
is at issue.
66.

The most prominent proponent of this point of view is Judge
Easterbrook. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An accountant’s greatest asset is its
reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful
work. Fees for two years’ audits could not approach the losses
[defendant] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client’s
fraud.”). Many other courts have found these assumptions persuasive.
See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 282
(3d Cir. 2006) (“The fact that the [auditors] earned fees for their
services does not establish that they acted with any culpable intent.”);
Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407,
1427 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that “the auditor had
become ‘entangled’ with [defendant] by offering discounts on its fees”);
Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e will not
indulge irrational inferences of the firm’s fraudulent intent based on
these generic allegations.”); Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP,
117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A] large independent
accountant will rarely, if ever, have any rational economic incentive to
participate in its client’s fraud.”).

67.

See Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2002, at 96, 99 (arguing that accountants have
strong reasons to stay in clients’ good graces especially because “accounting
firms have increasingly treated audits as ways to build relationships that
allow them to sell their more lucrative consulting services”); Mark, supra
note 60, at 1174–1205 (arguing that the DiLeo line of cases are wrongly
decided); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A
Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev.
133, 218 (2000) (“[I]t is inappropriate to assume . . . (a) that auditors and
audit firms are rational in the sense of the rational utility maximizer of
the traditional economic model, and (b) that it is always irrational for
auditors and audit firms to act recklessly or fraudulently.”). All of these
articles mine the literature of behavioral psychology and related fields to
argue that auditors and audit firms, like most individuals and organizations, do not act rationally much of the time. Even if they did, there
are many very practical reasons, including the lack of real competition
among audit firms, the tremendous costs to audit clients of switching
firms, and the short-term advantages that individual auditors could gain
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Class action attorneys argue that there are significant collateral
consequences to the application of an unreasonably high pleading
standard regarding accountants, including that “the corporation and
corporate insiders can then blame the absentee accountants, using the
classic ‘empty chair defense,’ a powerful jury argument for avoiding
management liability.” 69 But these pleas have failed to sway most
courts, which continue to cloak auditors with special protection.
c.

Scope of Special Treatment for Auditors

Representative of the special protections accorded by most courts
to external auditors when scienter pleading is at issue is the common,
but arguably extreme, “no audit at all” test. This most pro-auditor
formulation requires dismissal of a complaint unless it alleges that the
defendant auditors’ actions amounted to “no audit at all” 70 or, at
by making decisions that might undermine the long-term reputation of
their firms, that make it rational for auditors to sometimes violate the
rules. See id. at 202–07 (explaining that there is more price competition
than quality competition among auditors and providing an example of how
several firms had used temporary workers for tax returns while charging
premium prices). David Kahn and Gary Lawson have observed that
it is hard to dispute the evidence of what actually happens.
“Despite the clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale, experience
over the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers do acquiesce
in managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses
seem to dwarf the gains to be made from the individual client.”
Or, as King Arthur said to the Black Knight in Monty Python
and the Holy Grail when the Black Knight refused to acknowledge
that both of his arms had been cut off: “Look!”
David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss? Controlling Auditor
Incentives Through Random Selection, 53 Emory L.J. 391, 405 (2004)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:
“It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1405 (2002);
Monty Python and the Holy Grail (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975)).
68.

The “reputation always outweighs fees” argument has been accepted
even when the defendant firm was very small (allegedly “a couple of
guys in a strip mall down in . . . New Jersey”). In re MRU Holdings
Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 500, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). One familiar with
Bernard Madoff’s auditor, who collected healthy fees for years without
ever doing a substantive audit, certainly might wonder about the
strength of the reputational constraint upon small firms. See Diana B.
Henriques, The Wizard of Lies 254–55 (2011) (investing along with
other members of his accounting firm in Madoff’s brokerage firm while he
had falsely certified that he had done professional auditing services).

69.

Melvyn I. Weiss & Elizabeth A. Berney, Essay, Restoring Investor Trust
in Auditing Standards and Accounting Principles, 41 Harv. J. on
Legis. 29, 31–32 (2004).

70.

See, e.g., Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851,
855 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying without necessarily adopting the “no audit at
all” standard); Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Grant Thornton
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most, to a “pretended audit.” 71 As most commonly phrased, this test,
which might be called the Price Waterhouse test, 72 provides that
plaintiffs must plead and prove
that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit
amounted to no audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see the
obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that the accounting
judgments which were made were such that no reasonable
accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted
with the same facts. 73
LLP (In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. 07 Civ. 8663 (JSR), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33554, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) (discussing how “no
audit at all” is one way to prove scienter); In re Franklin Bank Corp. Sec.
Litig., 782 F. Supp. 2d 364, 402 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“It must be established
not merely that there was a deviation from accounting principles, but that
the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no
audit at all . . . .”); In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA
Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing the “no audit
at all” standard as the applicable standard); In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (using the “no audit at all” standard as
another way to describe the applicable standard); Maiden v. Merge Techs.,
No. 06-C-349, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84083, at *11–12 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20,
2008) (finding that advising against side agreements did not amount to “no
audit at all”); In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing the “no audit at all” standard as “demanding”);
In re Wet Seal, Inc. Sec. Litig., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(explaining that deliberate GAAP violations do not rise to “no audit at
all”); Lewis v. Straka, No. 05C1008, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 59054, at *5
(E.D. Wis., Aug. 13, 2007) (noting that a strong inference of scienter for an
auditor would have to amount “no audit at all”).
71.

See, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting
that scienter can be established by a “pretended audit”); McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (stressing that a
“plaintiff need not produce direct evidence of a defendant’s state of
mind” and that circumstantial evidence such as a “pretended audit”
may often be the principal means of proving bad faith); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(showing how circumstantial evidence such as a “pretended audit” can
prove scienter); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig.,
381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Recklessness requires a
showing that the auditor’s practices ‘amount[ed] at best to a pretended
audit.’” (quoting Rothman, 220 F.3d at 98)).

72.

While the courts have applied the “no audit at all” standard primarily
in class action cases for damages, they have also applied it to SEC
actions. E.g., SEC v. Gold, No. 05-CV-4713 (JS) (MLO), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87042, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006); SEC v. KPMG
LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Indeed, it apparently
originated in just such a case, SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp.
1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

73.

Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1426
(9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler,
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As phrased, this is an extremely malleable standard. Note that this formulation of the standard allows courts to apply anywhere from a nearly
impossibly high bar (“no audit at all”) to a standard that is arguably so
low as to improperly require only negligence rather than scienter (“no
reasonable accountant would have made the same decision”).74
2.

How does the motive and opportunity test
apply to external auditors?

As noted earlier, most courts allow plaintiffs pleading scienter to
point to both the motive and opportunity of defendants and the
circumstantial evidence indicating that they have acted fraudulently.
Regarding the motive and opportunity test, auditors generally cannot
profit by millions of dollars from corporate fraud like company
insiders can, so their economic incentives to commit fraud are
arguably not nearly as strong as those of their clients and their
clients’ employees. Therefore, unless auditors take bribes or engage in
insider trading, two presumably rare events (especially given
professional independence strictures against an auditor’s owning stock
in a client 75), it seems very difficult for plaintiffs to plead scienter by
auditor defendants via the motive and opportunity test. 76 This is
364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (using the same standard);
Dannenberg v. Painewebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec.
Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) (also using that standard).
74.

When this standard is applied, courts may conclude that liability may
arise if an auditor’s “judgment—at the moment exercised—was
sufficiently egregious such that a reasonable accountant reviewing the
facts and figures should have concluded that [those] financial statements
were misstated and that as a result the public was likely to be misled.”
In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 673 (3d Cir.
2002); see also Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin.
Servs. Noteholders Litig.), No. 08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at
*24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2008) (quoting language from IKON above).

75.

Code of Professional Conduct and Bylaws § 101.02 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 2011).

76.

This is not to say that accountants never get into trouble for insider
trading. Despite the seeming irrationality of risking their professional
reputation, they do engage in insider trading from time to time. See, e.g.,
Rosenthal v. N.Y. Univ., No. 10-4168-cv, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9817, at
*11–12 (2d Cir. May 16, 2012) (affirming university’s decision not to grant
an MBA candidate his degree after he admitted abusing his position as a
professional accountant to conduct insider trading); United States v.
Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 655–56 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding a senior auditor and
his acquaintance had engaged in insider trading); SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing how a bank’s independent
accountant traded in securities after receiving inside information); In re Ng,
Exchange Act Release No. 67,423, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. 3393, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-14947 (July 12,
2012) (ordering defendant to cease and desist from causing any violations of
section 10(b) and barring him from acting as an accountant); In re
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Peterson, Exchange Act Release No. 67,282, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 3391, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-14931
(June 27, 2012) (suspending accountant due to insider trading); In re
Konyndyk, Exchange Act Release No. 65,882, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 3339, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-14651
(Dec. 5, 2011) (trading in call options during the week before company
announced it would acquire another company by tender offer); SEC v.
Deskovick, Litigation Release No. 21,890, 100 SEC Docket 2519 (Mar. 18,
2011) (tipping close friend over potential sale and merger); SEC v. Acord,
Litigation Release No. 21132, 96 SEC Docket 1084 (July 15, 2009) (abusing
positions of trust and confidence by buying $329,000 worth of stock before
the company’s acquisition); SEC v. Chavarria, Litigation Release No.
20,313, 91 SEC Docket 2137 (Sept. 28, 2007) (engaging in unlawful insider
trading by purchasing securities in advance of an earnings release); SEC v.
Abide, Litigation Release No. 19,776, 88 SEC Docket 1596 (July 27, 2006)
(making and directing others to make improper accounting entries to
conceal improperly capitalized expenses); SEC v. Herwitz, Litigation
Release No. 19,499, 86 SEC Docket 2542, 2542 (Dec. 19, 2005) (settling
insider trading action against a former president of an accounting firm);
United States v. Robles, Litigation Release No. 17,778, 78 SEC Docket 1782
(Oct. 8, 2002) (discussing a criminal suit where an accountant was
convicted of nine counts of securities fraud, four counts of tender offer fraud,
and one count of conspiracy); SEC v. Iacovelli, Litigation Release No.
17,280, 76 SEC Docket 1275 (Dec. 19, 2001) (reselling 315,000 shares to
realize illegal profits of $272,182); SEC v. Martin, Litigation Release No.
17141, 75 SEC Docket 1950 (Sept. 20, 2001) (exchanging tax planning
advice for insider information); SEC v. Dornfeld, Litigation Release No.
16,869, 74 SEC Docket 520 (Jan. 23, 2001) (trading in advance of public
announcement of merger); SEC v. Humphries, Litigation Release No.
16,361, 71 SEC Docket 216 (Nov. 18, 1999) (acting on insider information
about a potential merger between Exxon and Mobil); SEC v. Hedén, 51 F.
Supp. 2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (freezing the defendant’s accounts and his
family’s account, which he used interchangeably, because the SEC was
likely to succeed on the merits of an insider trading investigation); SEC v.
Drabinsky, Litigation Release No. 16,033, 68 SEC Docket 2925 (Jan. 21,
1999) (assisting company’s directors in manipulating income and cash flows
and engaging in insider trading of the company’s securities); SEC v. Beers,
Litigation Release No. 15,823, 67 SEC Docket 1558 (July 30, 1998) (buying
1,000 shares of stock while in possession of material, nonpublic information);
SEC v. Kotecha, Litigation Release No. 15,765, 67 SEC Docket 648 (June 3,
1998) (using inside information to open and close positions in call and put
options in a company’s stock); SEC v. Hirsch, Litigation Release No. 15,607,
66 SEC Docket 575 (Jan. 6, 1998) (giving non-public information to brother
who shared that information with multiple people); SEC v. Sargent,
Litigation Release No. 14,854, 61 SEC Docket 1552 (Mar. 25, 1996)
(receiving and acting on material, nonpublic information); SEC v. Evans,
Litigation Release No. 14,767, 60 SEC Docket 2694 (Dec. 28, 1995) (finding
a senior accountant had tipped off his brother and his friend after doing due
diligence in preparation for a three-way merger); SEC v. Blair, Litigation
Release No. 13,956, 55 SEC Docket 2765 (Feb. 3, 1994) (asking former
fiancée to make stock purchases for him and providing funds to do so); SEC
v. Weinstein, Litigation Release No. 13,336, 52 SEC Docket 946 (Aug. 11,
1992) (ordering an accountant to pay civil damages in excess of $214,000
due to insider trading); SEC v. Adams, Litigation Release No. 11,439, 38
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particularly true because the courts reject as insufficient the pleading
of auditors’ most obvious economic motive for intentionally
overlooking an audit client’s fraud—they wish to keep the client as a
client and retain the audit-related and consulting-related revenue
flowing from that client. Although at least one court seemed amenable
to the notion that preserving the existence of an accountant-client
relationship might provide evidence of motive, 77 virtually all other
courts view this as a “general motive” that applies to all auditor
defendants and is therefore worthless for pleading scienter against a
specific auditor in a specific case. 78
SEC Docket 498 (May 20, 1987) (accountants improperly communicated
information).
77.

See In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that the existence of an accountant-client relationship, in
addition to an “unlikely degree of mere carelessness” on the part of the
accountant gives rise to an inference of motive).

78.

Loss aversion, the fact that people dread losses more than they anticipate
gains, provides psychological evidence for the conclusion that auditors
might well be strongly motivated to please a current client to avoid losing
the client to another audit firm. See generally Robin M. Hogarth,
Educating Intuition 166–67 (2001) (describing loss aversion). The
Supreme Court has intuited accurately that an accountant would be
more likely to commit fraud to keep a current client happy than to
acquire a new client. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 772 (1993). But
see Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d
1407, 1427 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting this argument as “utterly
without merit”); Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130
(2d Cir. 1994) (“In looking for a sufficient allegation of motive, we
assume that the defendant is acting in his or her informed economic selfinterest.”); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)
(describing how it would have been irrational for the firm to have
participated in the fraud); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. &
“ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[C]ompensation and maintenance of a profitable business relationship for auditing
services do not constitute a sufficient motive for scienter”); Queen Uno
Ltd. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360 (D. Colo.
1998) (characterizing allegations that Ernst & Young was motivated to
commit fraud to ensure continued receipt of audit fees from client as
“absurd”); ICD Holdings S.A. v. Frankel, 976 F. Supp. 234, 245 n.51
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he fact that the professional service firms like
[defendant] receive fees for their services is insufficient to supply the
motive essential to the motive-and-opportunity theory . . . .”); Duncan
v. Pencer, No. 94 Civ. 0321 (LAP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 401, at *33
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding it would be “economically irrational” for a large
accounting firm to “condone a client’s fraud in order to preserve a fee
that, at best, is an infinitesimal percentage of its annual revenues and, by
doing so, jeopardize its reputation and license, as well as subject itself to
potential damages literally tens of thousands of times as large as its fee”).
Of course, the fact that all auditors generally would like to keep
clients and attendant income and that individual auditors would all like
to keep their jobs does not mean that sometimes audit firms and
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How does the circumstantial evidence test apply to auditors?

As Professor Coffee has pointed out, with strict judicial
assumptions that auditors do not act with reckless or fraudulent
motives in place, “the plaintiff faces a ‘Catch 22’ dilemma in suing the
auditor: it cannot plead fraud with particularity until it obtains
discovery, and it cannot obtain discovery under the PSLRA until it
pleads fraud with particularity.” 79 This often makes it impossible for
plaintiffs to collect the circumstantial evidence that is the only
remaining route to pleading scienter against an auditor.
So, how does the circumstantial evidence test apply to auditors?
Where motive is not alleged and plaintiffs rely entirely on
circumstantial evidence to support allegations of recklessness, the
evidence presented must be proportionally greater, according to some
courts, 80 although most courts do not explicitly require this greater
proportionality. In accounting cases, catch-all or blanket allegations
often comprise mere claims of misreported numbers or GAAP and
GAAS (generally accepted auditing standards) violations; courts nearly
unanimously hold that such allegations, standing alone, will not
suffice. 81 “[T]he mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a
failure to follow GAAP, without more, does not establish scienter.” 82
individual auditors do not commit fraud for these purposes. See
Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. (In re Crazy
Eddie Sec. Litig.), 812 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining
that auditor told client officer that he did not investigate a suspicious
transaction because he might have had to leave account).
79.

Coffee, supra note 67, at 1410 n.35.

80.

See, e.g., Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)
(“Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant,
though the strength of the circumstantial evidence must be correspondingly
greater.” (citations omitted)); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F.
Supp. 2d 382, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that without an apparent
motive, circumstantial evidence of scienter must be correspondingly higher);
Zucker v. Sasaki, 963 F. Supp. 301, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that
circumstantial evidence must be proportionally greater).

81.

See, e.g., Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc. 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir.
2003) (“Allegations of GAAP violations are insufficient to state a
securities fraud claim unless coupled with evidence of corresponding
fraudulent intent.”); Migliaccio v. K-tel Int’l, Inc. (In re K-tel Int’l, Inc.
Sec. Litig.), 300 F.3d 881, 890 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Allegations of GAAP
violations are insufficient, standing alone, to raise an inference of
scienter.” (quoting Advanced Data Concepts v. Navarre Corp. (In re
Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2002))); Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]llegations of GAAP
violations or accounting irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to
state a securities fraud claim.”); Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc., 174
F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Allegations of a violation of GAAP
provisions or SEC regulations, without corresponding fraudulent intent,
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What “more” might suffice for plaintiffs attempting to plead
scienter? Consider the following factors that are often raised by
plaintiffs as circumstantial evidence of auditor scienter.
a.

Size of Mistakes

Allegations of mere accounting errors are generally viewed as
providing no evidence of scienter or recklessness by the external
auditor. But what if those errors were really large? A fifty dollar error
is one thing; 83 a fifty million dollar error is arguably something else
entirely. But in any given case it is likely unclear ahead of time
whether a court will decide that a large accounting error provides
circumstantial evidence of scienter or not. Many courts hold that even
large errors provide evidence of negligence, not of scienter. 84 The
Seventh Circuit said in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young that “[f]our billion
dollars is a big number, but even a large column of big numbers need
not add up to fraud.” 85 But other courts have held that a sufficiently
large error can indeed provide evidence of at least recklessness. 86
are not sufficient to state a securities fraud claim.” (quoting Chill v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996))).
82.

Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1426 (emphasis added) (quoting Malone
v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994)); see also
Dannenberg v. Painewebber, Inc., (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec.
Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting same language);
Limited, Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 645 F. Supp. 1038, 1045 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (“An inference of fraud does not arise from the mere fact that an
auditor ‘certified’ an inaccurate financial statement.”).

83.

It is unsurprising that courts find that small errors are evidence of
negligence rather than of fraud. See, e.g., Lewis v. Straka, No. 05C1008,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59054, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2007) (“The
amount that was misreported was a very small amount; the most that
can reasonably be inferred from the misreporting is mistake rather than
fraud.”).

84.

See, e.g., id. at *4 (“[L]arge losses do[ ] not create a strong inference of
scienter.”). Huge errors do not indicate scienter or raise a strong
inference of scienter under the PSLRA, some courts hold, because “no
degree of negligence” can create rule 10b-5 liability. Reiger v. Price
Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2000).

85.

DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).

86.

See, e.g., N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d
1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that while “magnitude alone is not
sufficient to support a finding of scienter, large GAAP and GAAS
violations can play a role in finding scienter”); In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding a strong
inference of scienter where defendants missed an understatement of $3
billion in debt and an overstatement of $240 million in revenue because
“[t]he more serious the error, the less believable are defendants’ protests
that they were completely unaware of [the company’s] true financial
status” (quoting Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1256
(N.D. Ill. 1997))); Carley Capital Grp. v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 27
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A compromise approach is embodied in court opinions holding
that the magnitude of a client’s fraud can support an inference of
scienter regarding the external auditor, but only “when the plaintiff
pleads specific and detailed facts showing that the magnitude either
enhanced the suspiciousness of specifically identified transactions, or
made the overall fraud glaringly conspicuous.” 87
b.

Multiple GAAP and GAAS Errors

There are disagreements regarding the evidentiary import of
multiple errors as well as of large errors. Again, a single GAAP or
GAAS error is one thing, but multiple errors might well constitute
something else. In some cases, courts hold that multiple GAAP and
GAAS violations are simply evidence of careless auditing. 88 But again,
there is confusion. In other cases multiple GAAP or GAAS errors
have been deemed evidence of actionable recklessness. 89
c.

Restatements

Even when GAAP violations lead to a restatement of financial
statements, most courts agree that while “subsequent restatement[s]
do indeed provide some circumstantial evidence from which to infer
F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (“While alleging a
misapplication of [GAAP] standing alone is insufficient, such allegation
when combined with a drastic overstatement of financial results can give
rise to a strong inference of scienter. . . . [T]he totality and magnitude of
the . . . accounting violations [may] constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of reckless or conscious misbehavior.”); Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at
1255–56 (“[T]hat defendants had to record a massive year-end increase
of $5 million in credit loss reserves and slash its reported yearly earnings
from $3.530 million to $325,000 weighs heavily in favor of a finding of
reckless disregard.”).
87.

P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589,
609 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting Reiger, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1013); see also In
re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting
that the magnitude of a GAAP error can play a role in a court’s
inferring scienter); Reiger, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 n.5 (relying on
“boilerplate ‘red flags’” regarding “weak internal accounting controls”
was not enough to infer scienter).

88.

See, e.g., Crosscil Inc. v. Gabriel Capital, L.P. (In re Merkin Sec.
Litig.), 817 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“GAAP or GAAS
violations, standing alone, are insufficient to state a claim for relief
against an accountant under the federal securities laws.”); In re Buca
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-1762 (DWF/AJB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75224,
at *46 (D. Minn., Oct. 16, 2006) (“GAAP violations, viewed collectively
with Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the magnitude of the restatement
and the alleged inadequate internal controls also are insufficient to give
rise to a strong inference of scienter.”).

89.

See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763
F. Supp. 2d 423, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that multiple GAPP or
GASS errors could not occur absent recklessness).
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scienter, ‘GAAP violations without more, do not establish scienter.’” 90
But, yet again, other courts hold that a large restatement can provide
circumstantial evidence of scienter. 91 They are more likely to so hold
when the accounting issue involved was simple, 92 than when it was
complex. 93 And if the fraud was well hidden from the auditor by the
client, even a massive restatement will not necessarily signal auditor
scienter. 94
d.

Auditor Access, Nonaudit Services, and Alumni

Many courts conclude that the fact that an auditor had full access
to and detailed knowledge of its clients’ affairs and records also fails
to give rise to an inference of scienter. 95 But if courts rely heavily on
90.

In re Cyberonics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (quoting Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs.,
497 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also In re Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. 02-6048 (HAA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81268, at *27–28
(D.N.J., Oct. 26, 2006) (“While the restatement indicates that a mistake
was made, that does not by itself show recklessness in the initial
recordation”); Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 697, 719 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (holding that restatements and other evidence of GAAP violations
were merely evidence of errors, not of fraud).

91.

See, e.g., Lewis v. Straka, No. 05-C-1008, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76716,
at *33 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2006) (“[A] large restatement may be circumstantial evidence of scienter.”); Spiegel, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (holding
that allegations of ignored red flags are relevant in proving scienter).

92.

See, e.g., In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 652
(E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that a “large restatement” that involved
violation of “relatively straightforward accounting principles”
constituted evidence of scienter by auditor).

93.

See, e.g., In re Acterna Corp. Sec. Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 561, 583 (D.
Md. 2005) (holding that a large restatement is not evidence of auditor’s
scienter where the accounting issue called for “complicated analysis”).

94.

See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & Erisa Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d
334, 392 (D. Md. 2004) (“While this case does involve a massive
financial restatement, this fact alone cannot establish scienter . . . .”); In
re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“It
does not seem reasonable to infer recklessness on the part of an auditor
solely from the magnitude of a fraud . . . .”).

95.

See, e.g., Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d
1003, 1009 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A]n independent accountant’s
relationship and acquired familiarity with its client does not impute the
accountant with knowledge of every idiosyncratic detail associated with
the client’s business.”); Queen Uno Ltd. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp.,
2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360 (D. Colo. 1998) (“It is equally implausible to
assert that because an accountant had access to a company’s internal
data, it by implication was aware of any fraudulent scheme, no matter
how far-reaching. Such a broad based rule would, as other courts have
noted, subject any accountant or high-ranking company official to
liability for even the most obscure allegation of fraud.”).
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the fact that auditors have been fooled by clients or had information
withheld by their clients to support a conclusion that there was a lack
of scienter, as they often do, 96 then it seems that complete access
should militate in favor of a scienter finding, at least where there are
sizable errors. 97
Similarly, plaintiffs sometimes allege that other ties between the
auditor and client, including former employees of the auditor now
employed by the client and the provision of nonaudit services, help
establish scienter. But courts generally hold that the provision of
nonaudit services for a client with a failed audit is evidence only of
negligence. 98 The Enron case appears to be an exception to this
general rule, as it includes a detailed discussion of Andersen’s change
in policies regarding both nonaudit services and waiting periods for
employees to become employees of the audit client. 99 While it is
difficult to generalize from the Enron case due to its unique nature
and the numerous alleged auditor improprieties, Congress notably
restricted both nonaudit services to public audit clients and
movement by employees of auditors and their clients in the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002. 100
A case concerning an audit firm alumnus that is emblematic of
the difficulty in establishing scienter is AUSA Life Insurance Co. v.
Ernst & Young, where the court found not only numerous GAAP
96.

See, e.g., Dimplex v. Scovill, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7983 (LMM), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1993) (agreeing that
auditor Deloitte was as much a victim of the fraud as were plaintiffs).

97.

See In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1036 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (“Plaintiffs have alleged that KPMG personnel had extensive
access to Spiegel and its financial records and failed to notice or react to
substantial accounting problems at Spiegel which ultimately led to its
bankruptcy.”). In In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 472, 499 (S.D.N.Y 2005), the court emphasized that Arthur
Andersen had touted its approach as one where it understood in depth
its clients’ business model and the court held that this made it difficult
for Andersen to claim that it was not willfully blind to the host of
accounting irregularities of its client WorldCom.

98.

See, e.g., Danis v. USN Commc’ns Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Even if this knowledge could be established, it would
merely support an inference of negligence.”).

99.

See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“Andersen had to split its auditing and
consulting practices, to ban current financial incentives that connected
the auditors’ compensation to their sales of consulting services, to
refrain from reporting internal audit work on audit clients, and to adopt
a waiting period before Arthur Andersen partners could become
employees of a client.”).

100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201(a), 209, 116
Stat. 745, 772, 775 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7234 (2006)).
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violations, but actual knowledge and acquiescence by the audit firm in
the violations. 101 The court found that Ernst & Young acquiesced in
the fraud due to the “close personal relationship” between the Ernst
& Young’s lead audit partner and the client’s chief executive, his
former partner. 102 Despite the findings of both actual knowledge of the
fraud and the personal relationship as reason for the acquiescence, the
court stated (without actually resolving the issue) that the scienter
issue was “a close question.” 103 The case was initially dismissed on loss
causation grounds, but the Second Circuit reversed and also found the
facts presented to be sufficient to establish scienter. 104 But the fact
that any judge could find the issue of scienter in such a case to be
questionable exemplifies the inherent malleability of the standard. 105
e.

Auditor Resistance to Client Practices

When auditors call clients’ attention to improper auditing practices, sometimes courts view this as evidence that they are trying to
do a good job and indicative of an absence of scienter, even if the
auditors proceed to certify that the financial statements accord with
GAAP. 106 But in other cases courts have held that even threatening to
issue a going concern opinion does not necessarily insulate an auditor
from liability if the auditor has proceeded to certify the financial
statements with knowledge of these issues, 107 although it “cut[s]
strongly in [the auditor’s] favor.” 108
101. See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 991 F. Supp. 234, 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[I]rregularities resulted in substantial overstatement
of JWP’s income in each of the years 1988 through 1990, with E&Y’s
knowledge and acquiescence. The annual no-default letters issued by
E&Y were also false in that they certified that JWP’s books had been
kept in accordance with GAAP, which E&Y knew was untrue.”), rev’d,
206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 248. The court went on to state that “the record suggests that, in
their confrontations with [the chief executive officer, the audit partner,]
and his associates exhibited a level of tolerance and timidity
inappropriate for an independent auditor. The ‘watch dog’ behaved
more like a lap dog.” Id.
103. Id.
104. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir. 2000).
105. Notably, the facts of the case were part of the motivation for revising auditor
independence standards. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor
Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76008, 76031 n.262 (Dec. 5,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
106. See Maiden v. Merge Techs., No. 06-C-349, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84083,
at *13 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2008) (“In fact, Merge admits that its former
management circumvented accounting controls to execute the fraud.”).
107. See, e.g., In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1037 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (“Nor is KPMG entitled to dismissal because it threatened to
issue a going concern statement . . . .”); Drabkin v. Alexander Grant &
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f.

Rapid Discovery of Fraud by Third Parties

When a third party such as a new CFO or a successor audit firm
quickly discovers a fraud that the external auditor has overlooked for
years, many courts find evidence supporting scienter. 109 But other
courts find this not to be especially persuasive evidence of scienter. 110
4.

The Importance of Red Flags

Today, no concept is more important to the scienter issue in
auditor litigation than the red flag. Although a heightened pleading
standard, such as the “no audit at all” test, often appears on its face
to be nearly insurmountable, courts have held that “[a] complaint
might reach this ‘no audit at all’ threshold by-alleging [sic] that the
auditor disregarded specific ‘red flags’ that ‘would place a reasonable
auditor on notice that the audited company was engaged in
wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors.’” 111
Co., 905 F.2d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Issuing a going concern
opinion may not insulate an accounting firm from liability . . . .”).
108. Drabkin, 905 F.2d at 455.
109. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 763
F. Supp. 2d 423, 517 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (reporting that plaintiffs alleged
that two parties discovered Bear Stearns’ financial statements’
overvaluation of assets and underestimation of risk exposure in a single
weekend); In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1231 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (holding that the fact that a new CEO discovered accounting
violations within months of taking the position provided evidence for an
inference that KPMG’s audit had been deliberately reckless).
110. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 695 (6th Cir.
2004) (the fact that consultants quickly found internal control
weaknesses is not necessarily evidence of recklessness); Puskala v. Koss
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 941, 951 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“This means that he
must have known that the company’s internal controls were completely
unreliable, not just that he was negligent in failing to ensure that
effective controls were in place.”).
111. Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (quoting In re IMAX Sec. Litig.,
587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also N.M. State Inv.
Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Considering the number, magnitude, and multi-year financial impacts of
these grants, it is certainly reasonable to infer scienter just as strongly as
an innocent inference.”); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438
F.3d 256, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2006) (“At the pleading stage, . . . allegations
of GAAS violations, coupled with allegations that significant ‘red flags’
were ignored, can suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss.”); In re AOL
Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 240
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Allegations of ‘red flags,’ when coupled with
allegations of GAAP and GAAS violations, are sufficient to support a
strong inference of scienter.” (citing In re Complete Mgmt. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 153 F. Supp. 2d 314, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); In re First Merchs.
Acceptance Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97 C 2715, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17760, at *32–33 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1998) (“[T]he allegations in the
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A reading of court opinions supports a hypothesis that when
courts desire to dismiss a case, they often focus upon the “no audit at
all” branch of the Price Waterhouse test, ignoring its other alternatives (i.e., egregious refusal to see, no reasonable accountant, etc.). 112
And, in so doing, they are strict in how they define the notion of a
red flag. Some cases hold that when auditors ignore red flags and
uncritically accept their clients’ explanations on all accounting issues,
their actions constitute “no audit at all.” 113 Courts refuse to find
“fraud by hindsight,” 114 but if red flags are present at the time of the
audit and the defendant auditors ignore them or investigate them

complaint, including the magnitude of the misstatements, the specific
GAAP and GAAS violations and the ‘red flags’ together support an
inference that Deloitte’s audit ‘amounted to no audit at all or an
egregious refusal to see the obvious or investigate the doubtful.’”); In re
Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“Because [the accountant] was immersed in [the company’s] operations
while performing its audit, and because the ‘red flags’ would be clearly
evident to any auditor performing its duties, one could reasonably
conclude that [the accountant] must have noticed the ‘red flags,’ but
deliberately chose to disregard them to avoid antagonizing [the
company] and incidentally frustrating its fraudulent scheme.”).
112. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Grant Thornton LLP (In
re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. 07 Civ. 8663 (JSR), 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis
33554, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) (noting that the “no audit at
all” cases “do not hold that the plaintiff must show that the auditor’s
conduct amounted to no audit at all,” but that they may also show “an
egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that
the accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable
accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted with the
same facts” (quoting In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d
370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))); SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217,
1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))); P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp.,
142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 609 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that although the court was
not willing to hold that the defendant had done no more than a pretended
audit, the number and magnitude of red flags could lead to a finding of “an
egregious refusal to see the obvious or investigate the doubtful such that no
reasonable accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted
with the same facts”).
113. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs. Noteholders
Litig.), No. 08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at *12 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 11, 2008).
114. Maiden v. Merge Techs., No. 06-C-349, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84083, at
*13 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2008) (citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
495 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Higginbotham, 495 F.3d
at 759–60 (“Hindsight is the only basis of the proposed inference—and,
as the Court observed in Tellabs, citing a famous opinion by Judge
Friendly, there is no ‘fraud by hindsight.’” (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007))).
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insufficiently, then plaintiffs may be held to be neither second
guessing nor alleging fraud by hindsight. 115
In applying the red-flag approach to judging the adequacy of
scienter pleading against auditors, courts tend to look for allegations
of “‘in your face facts,’ that cry out ‘how could [defendant auditor]
not have known that the financial statements were false.’” 116 Because
red flags must be viewed in context and as a part of the totality of
the situation, it is perhaps painting with too broad a brush to subject
to side-by-side comparison courts’ treatments of specific types of red
flags. Nonetheless, to do so seems to provide further evidence of the
confusion in the case law and the need for empirical examination.
Red flags, say some courts, are the audit risks or “risk factors” that
auditors are to consider under GAAS when performing an audit. 117 As
in other areas of scienter analysis, courts have considerable discretion in
characterizing events as red flags and in drawing conclusions from
them, which means that results are often inconsistent. 118

115. See, e.g., Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (requiring “sufficiently
identified red flags, that is, particular facts, the disregard of which
establishes recklessness sufficient to establish scienter”); Malack, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at *26 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
based on “repeated decisions not to investigate multiple red flags”);
Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings, 542 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[R]ed flags . . . alerted or should have alerted GGK, absent
recklessness, to the fictitious sales.”).
116. N.M. State Inv. Council, 641 F.3d at 1103 (quoting In re Oxford Health
Plans, Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
117. See, e.g., McCurdy v. SEC, 396 F.3d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing factors that are “red flags”); Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d
at 512 (“‘Red Flags,’ or audit risks, are the various ‘risk factors’ that
auditors must consider under GAAS when performing an audit.”
(quoting In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 192, 240 n.51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))); In re Sunterra Corp. Sec.
Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“‘Red flags’ are
those facts which come to the attention of an auditor which would place
a reasonable auditor on notice that the audited company was engaged in
wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors.” (citing Van de Velde v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Mass. 1995))).
118. See Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the
Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in
Accountants’ Liability 205, 300 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study ed.,
2006) (noting that district courts exercise considerable individual
discretion in how they evaluate red flags, “often creating unpredictable
and arguably inconsistent results”); see also In re Spear & Jackson Sec.
Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting
inconsistencies among courts regarding types of events they view as red
flags indicating evidence of fraud).
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a.

Generally Reliable Red Flags

Whistleblowers. Apparently reliable tips from knowledgeable
whistleblowers are usually treated as a red flag that cannot be ignored
by auditors. In re Sunbeam Securities Litigation is a case where
plaintiffs satisfied pleading requirements by pointing to numerous red
flags, including not only GAAP and GAAS violations, but also
allegations that the auditor failed to properly investigate internal
controls, was tipped off by a Sunbeam employee regarding accounting
improprieties, and ignored a press article alleging Sunbeam had
manipulated the financial statements. 119 In In re Lehman Bros.
Securities & ERISA Litigation, the court threw out most claims for
lack of red flags, but did allow one claim to proceed based on a
Lehman insider telling auditor Ernst & Young (which then did
nothing) that Lehman was using “Repo 105’s” (barely disguised loan
transactions) to temporarily take $50 billion in debt off its books at
the end of every quarter. 120
Resignation of previous auditor. Another red flag courts have
naturally accorded weight is the mid-audit resignation of a previous
external auditor, typically the defendant’s predecessor. 121
b.

Not Necessarily Red Flags

Most categories of potential red flags are treated inconsistently,
sometimes viewed as red flags that should have put auditors on notice
of fraud that they ignored at their peril and sometimes not.
Knowledge of weak internal controls. An auditor’s knowledge of a
client’s poor internal controls usually carries little weight with
courts. 122 Like simple allegations of departures from GAAP, these
119. In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1344–46 (S.D. Fla.
1999).
120. In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); see also Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund v. Peat Marwick Main &
Co. (In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig.), 812 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (ignoring an anonymous whistleblower’s tip was part of the
evidence of scienter underlying securities fraud that was predicate to a
RICO claim).
When whistleblower complaints are adequately responded to, of
course, evidence of scienter is eliminated. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 790 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (director defendants insulated from liability where they
reviewed and discussed the allegations made by a whistleblower).
121. See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs.
Noteholders Litig.), Case No. 08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at
*9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2008) (discussing implications of the resignation
of a predecessor auditor).
122. See, e.g., Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 816 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding that knowledge of weak internal controls, even coupled with
large GAAP errors, was not sufficient to establish scienter).
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allegations may well be deemed “boilerplate allegations” of red
flags. 123 When accounting firms notice poor controls and extend their
normal audit procedures in order to compensate, this action is
obviously evidence that militates against a finding of scienter. 124 On
the other hand, some courts do hold that knowledge of weak controls
can, in tandem with other facts, support a finding of scienter. 125
End of quarter transactions. Another seemingly obvious red flag is
the presence of large end-of-quarter transactions. 126 But not all courts
agree. For instance, in DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software,
Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the client recorded as “start-up fees”
two revenue transactions, one for $250,000 and the other for $338,220
on the last day of the fiscal year, never previously having recorded a
start-up fee exceeding $5,000. 127 The plaintiffs also alleged that twelve
other revenue transactions were questionable for a variety of reasons,
including no signed agreement, no license fee specified, no payment
required within twelve months, unexpired customer cancellation privileges, and incomplete performance by the software firm. 128 Despite these
questionable transactions, the auditor issued a clean opinion. The client
later admitted to GAAP violations and issued a restatement. 129 Even
assuming the claims were true, however, the court stated that a failure
to investigate in such a situation “established only a negligent audit
rather than scienter.” 130
Aggressive accounting practices. Some courts have found red flags
where a client’s accounting practices were arguably in violation of
123. See Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1009 n.5 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (referring to the fact that the audited
company had weak internal controls as “boilerplate ‘red flags’”).
124. See In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 672 (3d
Cir. 2002) (refusing to infer scienter where defendant chose not to rely
on its internal audit findings).
125. See N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089,
1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that, in tandem with many other factors,
evidence of auditor’s knowledge of weak internal controls helped
plaintiffs get over the scienter pleading bar).
126. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 192, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that “late-in-the-quarter
revenue recognition has been found sufficient to support a claim of
scienter”); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1044 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“The most significant of these red flags was the
fact that on numerous occasions, major transactions took place within
the last few days of the quarter.”).
127. DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 389
(9th Cir. 2002).
128. Id. at 390.
129. Id. at 389–90.
130. Id. at 390.
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GAAP or more aggressive than their competitors’ practices. 131 But
other courts have found this to be evidence only of negligence, unless
the auditor was actively involved in advising the client regarding the
overly aggressive accounting practices, in which case the courts are
more likely to hold that the auditor was guilty of scienter for
overlooking the aggressiveness. 132
Unusual accounting practices. When auditors find evidence of
unusual accounting practices, sometimes courts view a failure to
further investigate as mere negligence, 133 but other times view it as a
red flag that was ignored, signaling scienter. 134
Other sloppy auditing practices. Courts have held that “lack of
evidential matter and numerous unsupported entries” were “red flags”
indicative of fraud when the auditor ignored them. 135 Contrariwise,
other courts have held that failure to gather evidential matter and
otherwise comply with GAAS did not necessarily constitute evidence
of misconduct beyond simple negligence. 136
131. See In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F.
Supp. 2d 423, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that securities complaint
alleging that violation of GAAP constituted reckless disregard of red
flags was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss); Malack v. BDO
Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs. Noteholders Litig.), Case No.
08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2008)
(finding the defendant’s insistence on a material decrease in the discount
rate to a rate lower than the bottom end of its peer range was one of
several red flags that the court found significant).
132. See, e.g., In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 484–85
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that auditor’s violation of GAAP not itself
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, unless the auditor was
extensively involved in the client’s process by which revenue recognition
policy is developed).
133. See, e.g., Dimplex v. Scovill, Inc., 88 Civ. 7983 (LMM), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1993) (holding that an auditor’s
failure to pursue certain “‘smelly’ documents” and to follow up on
“discrepancies and exceptions” was evidence of negligence only).
134. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 498
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that facts indicating wrongdoing by
management constitute red flags).
135. P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589,
609 (D.N.J. 2001).
136. See In re Crocs, Inc. Sec. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1154 (D. Colo.
2011) (finding allegations of failure to follow GAAS and secure adequate
evidential material may constitute only negligence and emphasizing that
plaintiffs did not allege that any Deloitte employee was present at any
specific meeting in which the fraudulent scheme was discussed);
Montalvo v. Tripos, Inc., No. 4:03CV995SNL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22753, at *19 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding that allegations that
GAAP and GAAS violations occurred only establish negligence where
plaintiffs failed to identify “facts giving rise to deliberate intent or
reckless conduct to defraud”).
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This Part concludes that courts are deeply divided regarding the
scienter standard to be applied in auditor cases, the acts that
constitute circumstantial evidence of scienter, and the acts that do or
do not raise red flags that potentially convert evidence of auditor
carelessness into evidence of auditor scienter. Though these conclusions are based on an extensive reading of the case law, they are
scarcely complete or systematic. Therefore, Part II undertakes a
rigorous empirical analysis designed to either confirm or contradict
the initial conclusion that the case law is so malleable that it can
support most conclusions in most cases, granting judges nearly
complete discretion in ruling on motions to dismiss.

II. An Emprical Analysis of Scienter Case Law
Related to Auditor Defendants
A.

Introduction and Sample Description

Previous empirical studies have generally supported the
conclusion reached in Part I, that there is great uncertainty in the law
regarding scienter pleading under rule 10b-5. Grundfest and
Pritchard, in studying the early years of post-PSLRA pleading, found
little predictability in court decisions:
Judges can also value ambiguity to the extent that it allows
them greater latitude to exercise discretion, more room within
which to compromise with colleagues, and increased opportunity
to avoid resolutions that they view as unjust or incorrect by
whatever metric they might apply. Judge Posner, for example,
suggests that judges often vote “their policy preferences and
personal convictions,” within the confines of the “rules” of
judging, as part of the judging “game.” 137

Does an empirical study of rule 10b-5 scienter cases involving
auditors support or undermine this picture? To examine this issue, we
collect data from securities class action complaints where the auditor
is named. Our initial sample comes from the RiskMetrics Securities
Class Actions Services database and includes cases naming auditors as
defendants where the original case was filed between 1996 and 2005
and the auditor portion of the case was resolved by December 2011.
We utilize this time period because all cases are under the same legal
framework under the PSLRA, and cases against auditors often take
numerous years to resolve. We then match cases involving auditors to
complaints from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.
137. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627, 681 (2002) (quoting Richard A.
Posner, Overcoming Law 131 (1995)).
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In order to keep data collection manageable and to ensure that the
defendant firms have reasonably similar resources, we limit our
sample to cases against the Big 4 (formerly, Big 5 and Big 6) audit
firms that involve claims under rule 10b-5. The sample includes a
total of 144 cases involving the major audit firms.
B.

Variable Definitions

Due to our limited sample size, we cannot code every possible
allegation by plaintiffs and still maintain sufficient degrees of freedom
to conduct analyses. We do, however, define numerous commonly
used allegations and utilize common themes (Notice, Risk, and
Independence) to group certain variables and define other variables
individually.
The Notice group variable includes allegations that the auditor
was informed or had notice of the alleged fraud, from either the press
(Press) or a firm employee (Employee), such as a whistleblower. The
Risk group includes several variables that commonly imply that a
client’s audit is higher risk than normal, including poor internal
controls (Controls), financial distress (Distress), unusual or
questionable transactions, particularly at the end of financial
reporting periods (Transactions), and executive turnover (Turnover).
The final group is Independence, which includes allegations that the
auditor was “too close” to the client, including the provision of
nonaudit services (NAS), the employment of alumni from the audit
firm at the client, and allegations of unlimited or unusually high
auditor access to the client (Access). 138
The individual variables are broken out separately for two
reasons. First, the “Benchmark” variable, defined as the client firm
displaying an unusual propensity to hit earnings or revenue benchmarks or debt covenants, does not fit well within another group.
Second, other individual variables may have implications beyond
simply being a red flag. For instance, in addition to providing the
auditor notice that the client may have an incentive to commit fraud,
the “Offering” variable indicates that section 11 liability is likely also
present. 139 “SEC” and “Restatement” can be viewed as providing
relatively “hard evidence” that something was wrong in the client’s
financial statements. 140 In particular, the Restatement variable
138. Prior research finds that nonaudit service fees result in a higher
probability of settlement. See Jaime J. Schmidt, Perceived Auditor
Independence and Audit Litigation: The Role of Nonaudit Services Fees,
87 Acct. Rev. 1033, 1055 (2012).
139. Section 11 of the 1933 Act is, of course, a negligence-based liability
provision. See 1933 Securities Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
140. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 35, 43
(2009) (defining “prefiling hard evidence as a public announcement
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provides an admission of an accounting misstatement, although courts
generally hold that a restatement by itself is not indicative of
scienter. 141 “High audit fees” may provide evidence of scienter, but the
inference behind this variable is substantially crowded due to its
mechanical relation with litigation risk. A vast accounting literature
finds that auditing firms price litigation risk into engagements. 142
Thus, relatively high audit fees could indicate not only the idea that
the client “bought off” the auditor or that the auditor could not
afford to lose the client but also that the auditor was aware of
potential litigation risk. The “GAAS” variable indicates that the
plaintiff alleges that the audit process itself was deficient.
These variables are defined in detail in Table 1. Each variable is
an indicator variable, equal to one if the definition is met, zero
otherwise. The group heading variables are equal to one if any
subvariable is equal to one, zero otherwise. 143 Table 1 also contains
the relative frequency with which each type of allegation appears in
the sample.

prior to the lawsuit filing of an accounting restatement . . . or an SEC
investigation or enforcement action”).
141. E.g., DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385,
390 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. E.g., Dan A. Simunic & Michael T. Stein, The Impact of Litigation Risk
on Audit Pricing: A Review of the Economics and the Evidence, 15
Auditing: J. Prac. & Theory 119, 126 (Supp. 1996) (summarizing
that empirical evidence shows U.S. audit fees increase with higher
litigation risk).
143. Note that the “Group” percentage will not necessarily be the sum of the
specific allegation percentages because many complaints make multiple
allegations in the same area.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions

Variables

Definition

Notice

Press
Employee

Case %
38.2%

A press story questioned client accounting
practices.

29.2%

A client firm employee told the auditor about
fraud or questionable accounting practices.

15.3%

Risk

88.2%

Controls

Internal controls were deficient or inadequate.

69.4%

Distress

The client was in financial distress or filed for
bankruptcy.

38.2%

Transactions

Questionable, complex, or unusual client
transactions should have alerted the auditor of
suspicious activity.

70.1%

Turnover

A high-level executive left the firm or was fired.

38.2%

Independence

59.0%

Nonaudit service (NAS) fees made the client very
important to the audit firm.

36.8%

Alumni

Alumni of the audit firm are in prominent
positions at the client, particularly in financial
reporting.

15.3%

Access

The auditor had “unlimited” (or similar word)
access to the client’s books and operations.

47.9%

NAS

Benchmark

The firm had unusual consistency meeting
earnings or revenue benchmarks (year-to-year
growth, analyst forecasts, etc.) or managed
earnings to avoid missing debt covenants.

82.6%

Offering

The client had an equity offering, debt offering,
or engaged in a merger or acquisition during the
class period.

79.9%

SEC

The SEC investigated the firm’s accounting
practices.

30.6%

Restatement

Financial statements from the alleged fraud
period were later restated.

65.3%

High audit fees

Large audit fees made the client very important
to the audit firm.

34.7%

GAAS

Violations of generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS) occurred during the audit.

70.1%
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C.

Univariate Correlations

Offering

SEC

Restatement

High Audit Fee

GAAS

Independence

Benchmark

Risk

Independence

Notice

Risk

Merit

Notice

Settle

Merit

Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix

0.35

-0.04

0.00

-0.02

0.17

-0.06

0.15

0.26

0.23

-0.11

0.21

0.14

0.28

0.04

-0.06

0.32

0.28

0.24

0.04

0.29

0.28

0.10

-0.03

0.19

0.09

0.24

0.33

0.40

0.12

-0.02

0.15

0.09

0.27

0.47

0.03

-0.03

0.34

0.25

0.61

0.72

0.27

-0.01

-0.03

0.10

-0.06

-0.04

0.00

-0.11

-0.06

0.29

0.43

0.27

0.29

0.10

Benchmark

Offering

SEC

Restatement
High Audit Fee

0.48

Table 2 contains univariate (Pearson) correlations between the
primary independent variables (as defined above) and two outcome
variables. The first outcome variable is “Settle,” indicating the case
survived the motion to dismiss. The second outcome variable is
“Merit,” indicating the auditor settled the case for at least $5 million,
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the approximate cost of taking an average case to trial. 144 On a
univariate basis, 118 (81.9%) of the cases survive the motion to
dismiss and settle (Settle), while only 52 (36.1%) of the cases reach a
settlement of at least $5 million (Merit). Prior studies use similar
definitions of meritorious outcomes with respect to the primary
defendants in securities class actions. 145
The correlations in Table 2 reveal several interesting patterns.
First, even on a univariate basis, the Settle variable is uncorrelated
with many of the most common plaintiff allegations: Notice, Risk,
Independence, Offering, and GAAS. The only independent variables
significantly (at the 10% level, as noted by bold type) correlated with
Settle are Benchmark, SEC, Restatement, and High Audit Fee.
Second, the Merit variable is significantly correlated with more
variables, indicating that settlement negotiations may take into
account factors that do not appear to influence courts. While the
Benchmark variable loses significance, the Notice and Risk variables
become significant when correlated with Merit.
Among the independent variables, the correlations are as one
would expect. For instance, SEC and Restatement are highly
correlated (0.29), and all of the variables that relate to the auditor’s
conduct (Independence, High Audit Fee and GAAS) are highly
correlated.
D.

Multivariate Analysis

We now move to a multivariate setting to investigate which
factors are most relevant to the court’s decision. We utilize logistic
regression because we have a binary dependent variable. Our first
model is as follows:

(1)
“Settle” is a dichotomous variable that is set to one if a lawsuit
withstands the motion to dismiss, and to zero otherwise. F is the

144. The audit firms disclosed that they spent an average of approximately
$3.5 million defending a rule 10b-5 securities class action case in 1991
dollars. J. Michael Cook et al., The Liability Crisis in the United States:
Impact on the Accounting Profession, J. Acct., Nov. 1992, at 19, 20.
Adjusted for inflation, this is equivalent to roughly $5 million per case
over our sample period.
145. E.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The
Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 627, 646 (2007) (defining “‘nuisance’ settlements” as less than
0.5% of the firm’s market value ten days before the end of the class
period).
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cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, and other
variables are as defined above.
Model (2) is identical to model (1), but the dependent variable is
“Merit,” which is set to one when the auditor settles for at least $5
million, zero otherwise. This model is provided to provide
corroborating evidence regarding whether the factors that the court
takes into account also affect the settlement negotiation. The second
model is as follows:

(2)
Models (3) and (4) are very similar to models (1) and (2),
respectively, but break the Notice, Risk, and Independence variables
into their sub-components. Models (3) and (4) are as follows:

(3)

(4)
Table 3 presents results from estimating these regressions:
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Results

Panel A: Regressions utilizing group variables
Model (1)

Model (2)

Dependent
Variable

Settle

t-stat

Merit

t-stat

Intercept

1.30

1.34

-2.32**

2.49

Notice

-0.33

0.62

0.84*

1.94

Risk

0.38

0.44

1.03

1.29

Independence

-0.79

1.20

-1.19*

1.67

1.85

0.08

0.14

-0.14

0.26

Benchmark

1.15*

Offering

-1.12

1.45

SEC

0.51

0.75

1.11**

2.47

Restatement

1.39**

2.56

1.11**

2.32

High Audit Fee

1.75**

2.38

1.00*

1.76

GAAS

-1.09

1.40

-0.44

n

144

144

Pseudo R2

0.295

0.272

0.64

*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests

484

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5

Panel B: Regressions utilizing all individual variables
Model (3)

Model (4)

Dependent
Variable

Settle

t-stat

Merit

t-stat

Intercept

1.41

1.48

-1.96**

2.27

Press

0.20

0.33

1.20**

2.43

Employee

-0.42

0.56

0.16

0.27

Controls

0.03

0.05

0.81

1.45

Distress

0.29

0.50

0.20

0.43

Transactions

-0.33

0.49

-0.45

0.74

Turnover

-0.19

0.29

0.76*

1.65

NAS

-0.66

0.85

0.11

0.18

Alumni

1.26

1.10

-0.01

0.02

Access

-0.78

1.08

-1.35**

2.03

Benchmark

1.28*

1.85

0.29

0.48

-0.21

0.38

Offering

-1.10

1.42

SEC

0.37

0.52

1.09**

2.20

Restatement

1.35**

2.30

0.85*

1.72

High Audit Fee

2.16**

2.48

1.04

1.47

1.16

-0.71

0.97

GAAS

-0.96

n

144

144

Pseudo R2

0.318

0.356

*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests

485

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5

Models (1) and (3) produce consistent results, with only
Benchmark, Restatement, and High Audit Fee being significant.
Thus, courts do not appear to be influenced by most of the allegations
in plaintiffs’ complaints, and in particular there is little consistency in
the treatment of red flags. Courts specifically state that restatements,
without accompanying red flags, are not indicative of fraud. 146 High
Audit Fee is also consistent with increased litigation risk being
correlated with auditors being sued, 147 which is not particularly
surprising. Thus, Benchmark is the only variable that could be
interpreted as a red flag that is significant.
When examining which cases reach settlements that likely reflect
a meritorious underlying case, the results from estimating models (2)
and (4) suggest that other factors also play a role. For instance, in
model (2), Notice and SEC are also significant. The results from
estimating model (4) suggest that reports in the press (Press) are
driving the relationship between Notice and Merit. The statistical
significance of SEC and Notice/Press seem reasonable with respect to
the meritorious outcome of cases. The fact that these are significant
in reaching a material settlement, but not in the dismissal decisions of
courts, lends some support to the view that court decisions are not
systematic.
Similar to earlier results, Restatement remains significant in all
specifications, although High Audit Fee is significant only in model
(2). Interestingly, Independence is marginally significant in model (2),
and the results from model (4) suggest that this is driven by a
significantly negative relation between Access and Merit. While this
relation is difficult to explain logically, it could be that cases where
the plaintiff makes allegations consistent with the Access variable are
relatively weaker and do not present other facts consistent with fraud.
E.

Sensitivity Analysis

It is of course possible that other factors affect case outcomes. For
instance, professors Pritchard and Sale examined how case outcomes
in securities class actions against the primary defendants vary by
circuit, focusing on the Second and Ninth Circuits where the highest
numbers of cases are filed. 148 Again, our relatively small sample size
does not lend itself to this type of within-circuit analysis as even the
Second Circuit (29 cases) and Ninth Circuit (24 cases) have relatively
few cases. However, we do examine whether the circuit in which the
146. E.g., DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385,
390 (9th Cir. 2002).
147. See, e.g., Simunic & Stein, supra note 142, at 126 (summarizing that
empirical evidence shows that U.S. audit fees increase with higher
litigation risk).
148. Pritchard & Sale, supra note 4.
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case is filed could affect the motion to dismiss decision by including
indicator variables for the three circuits with at least 15 cases (in
addition to the Second and Ninth, the Eleventh Circuit has a
relatively high filing rate with 15 cases). None of these circuit
indicator variables is significant, and the coefficients on other
variables are not significantly affected.
In addition, as noted above, the Offering variable could be an
imperfect proxy for section 11 liability. We code a separate indicator
variable for whether a case has a section 11 claim, and reexamine the
outcome of the motion to dismiss decision. We include this variable in
lieu of the Offering variable. We find that this variable is marginally
significant (p = 0.087) in the equivalent of model (1), but marginally
insignificant in the equivalent of model (3) (p = 0.120).

III. Implications
Part I’s reading of numerous cases pursuant to a doctrinal analysis
indicates that the courts largely agree that auditor defendants in rule
10b-5 cases should receive special protection in the form of higher
pleading standards, but it also reveals that there is substantial court
disagreement regarding what form that special protection should take,
what facts provide circumstantial support for a claim of auditor
scienter, and what facts might constitute red flags indicating that
auditors who ignored them were more than merely negligent. These
conclusions are reaffirmed by Part II’s empirical conclusions that few
factors are consistently viewed by the courts as indicative (or not) of
auditor scienter. What are the practical implications of these findings?
A.

Uncertainty

The uncertainty of rule 10b-5 pleading doctrine and its
application has greatly bothered auditors. Part of their complaint is
overblown. Whether or not judges view these actions such as ignoring
red flags as indicative of scienter, these actions certainly indicate
unsound (even if only negligent) auditing practices. Auditors are not
saying: “We thought it was okay to do these things.” What they are
saying is: “We know we shouldn’t do these things, but we would like
to be more certain about the adverse consequences of doing things we
know we shouldn’t.” This is a legitimate complaint, but not a terribly
sympathetic one. 149

149. Auditors also complain that potential damages turn “on factors outside
the auditor’s control.” Ctr. for Audit Quality, Reports of the
Major Public Company Audit Firms to the Department of the
Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 33
(2008), available at http://www.thecaq.org/publicpolicy/data/TRData
2008-01-23-FullReport.pdf. That is a bit of an overstatement, at least
regarding the topic of this Article. If auditors perform good audits and
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On the other hand, auditors are on firm ground when they
complain that unpredictable scienter doctrine makes it very difficult for
them to judge the settlement value of a case. 150 And this is obviously a
very significant concern as well for plaintiffs and, of course, plaintiffs’
attorneys. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, in particular, make very substantial
economic investments when they file rule 10b-5 class action lawsuits, 151
and it is difficult for them to gauge the wisdom of such a filing when it
is unclear how courts will treat the known scienter evidence. For both
plaintiffs and defendants, the uncertainty of scienter pleading doctrine
has decidedly unsatisfactory consequences.
B.

Judicial Discretion

When applicable legal rules are in great dispute and their application
in specific cases is unconstrained, as both the doctrinal and empirical
portions of this Article indicate is the case for the rule 10b-5 scienter
pleading standard, judges enjoy plentiful discretion in deciding whether
to dispose of rule 10b-5 private suits for damages in their early stages.
This might be a good thing. Hart and Sacks have noted regarding
the general application of law that “[d]iscretion is a vehicle of good far
more than of evil. It is the only means by which the intelligence and
good will of a society can be brought to bear directly upon the
solution of hitherto unsolved problems.” 152 Arthur Miller has agreed:
“I love judicial discretion. . . . We have to give [district judges] some
elbow room objectively, individualistically, and contextually.” 153
do not make material mistakes, the excessive malleability of scienter
pleading law is unlikely to cause them a significant problem.
150. Audit firms are often “confronted with . . . lawsuit[s] in which [they]
face[ ] an uncertain outcome at trial and potentially catastrophic liability
if [they were to] lose[ ]. Settlement is therefore often viewed as the only
sensible alternative, because no firm has the resources to take a case to
trial when the downside risk is a multi-billion dollar or even a multihundred million dollar, catastrophic judgment.” Id. at 35.
151. For class action plaintiffs’ attorneys, the filing of a lawsuit is an
investment decision, and typically a very expensive one. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 684–90 (1986) (explaining
that plaintiffs’ attorneys have more reason to be hesitant to invest in an
action than their clients because attorney fee awards tend to decline as
recovery size increases); Ronald A. Dabrowski, Note, Proportionate
Liability in Rule 10b–5 Reckless Fraud Cases, 44 Duke L.J. 571, 590–91
(1994) (“Plaintiff’s attorneys view securities class actions as high-riskhigh-reward investments”).
152. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 158
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
153. Arthur Miller, Remarks at the Public Hearings of the Third Circuit Task
Force on the Selection of Class Counsel (June 1, 2001), quoted in Richard
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An extraordinarily subjective scienter test with lots of play in the
joints allows trial judges who have a gut feeling that an overall claim
is nonmeritorious to dispose of the case very early on, with a savings
of resources to society, to defendants, and even to plaintiffs. Allowing
such discretion could lead to superior resolutions of disputes. 154 One
may read a bevy of these opinions and conclude that few of them
seem plainly erroneous on their face. That is a good sign.
Of course, judges are lawyers, and it would be a poor lawyer who,
given the opportunity to select from a range of pliable legal rules and
to pick and choose among factual allegations, could not cobble
together a reasonably persuasive argument for whichever choice he or
she made. After analyzing what seemed to be a particularly questionable prodefendant decision by the Fourth Circuit in Public
Employees’ Retirement Ass’n of Colorado v. Deloitte & Touche,
LLP, 155 Steinberg and Appel noted that the “no audit at all” standard
“can be applied to shield virtually any decision requiring an auditor’s
judgment or discretion in the performance of the audit, beyond purely
technical accounting treatments.” 156
Still, if federal judges are honest, objective, and rational, granting
them great discretion, as current scienter pleading law does, seems
largely unobjectionable. But while few question federal judges’
subjective honesty, there are substantial grounds upon which to
challenge their rationality and objectivity.

L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1561,
1561 (2003); see also Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at
Procedural Discretion, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1964 (2007) (noting
that discretion in case management is to some degree “inevitable and
desirable,” but arguing for reducing that discretion); Marcus, supra, at
1562 (noting that “discretion is an inescapable aspect of legal decisionmaking” (citing Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives
from Law and Social Science, in The Uses of Discretion 11, 11–12
(Keith Hawkins ed., 1992))).
154. See Su, supra note 39, at 546 (“[T]here are benefits to giving judges some
interpretive latitude. A determination of scienter sometimes requires judges
to look beyond the facts to the nuances of the case. Proving the mental
state of a defendant is already difficult; thus, by allowing judges to look
holistically at all of the claims to get the bigger picture, they are able to
come to a more equitable conclusion.” (footnote omitted)).
155. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n of Colo. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 551 F.3d
305 (4th Cir. 2009).
156. Marc I. Steinberg & Dustin L. Appel, A Prolonged Slump for “PlaintiffPitchers”: The Narrow “Strike Zone” for Securities Plaintiffs in the
Fourth Circuit, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1923, 1972–73 (2010).
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1.

Judges’ Bounded Rationality

Although economists have traditionally modeled people as
rational actors, 157 this is only roughly accurate. Herbert Simon won a
Nobel Prize in economics by establishing that people are rational, but
only boundedly so. 158 An important part of the new knowledge that
undermines the rational actor model is the heuristics and biases
literature created by Nobel Prize–winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky and their intellectual progeny. There is now a vast amount of
research in this field establishing a large number of related (and
sometimes overlapping) heuristics, biases, and other cognitive errors
that ensure that people generally fall short of full rationality when
they make decisions.
Because judges are people, it makes sense to assume that they are
subject to these forces. And, as empirical studies demonstrate, they are.
Professors Guthrie and Rachlinski, along with Federal Magistrate
Judge Andrew Wistrich found evidence that judges are subject to a
range of heuristics, biases, and cognitive limitations, including
anchoring and adjustment, 159 framing, 160 the representativeness heuristic, 161 the egocentric (overconfidence) bias, 162 and the hindsight bias. 163
157. See Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 198–99 (“[O]ur legal intuitions are
shaped by the assumption that humans are self-interested beings who
behave as free moral agents and who make rational choices. Woven
throughout our jurisprudence is the theory that humans are motivated
to act out of self-interest and that every individual is rational and
selfish.” (footnote omitted)).
158. Robert Trivers recently wrote that the “alleged science called economics
. . . has resolutely failed to ground itself in underlying knowledge, at a
cost to all of us.” Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools 8 (2011).
159. People have a tendency to focus on an initial number or position, even if
it is completely irrelevant to the decision to be made, and then to fail to
adjust adequately in the face of new information. See Richard H.
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 23–24 (2008) (discussing the effect
of anchoring on the decision making process).
160. People often change their decisions in completely inconsistent ways
depending upon how the question put to them is framed. See Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 79 Or. L. Rev. 61, 99 (2000) (“Like anchoring, framing
seems to lie beyond the ability of courts to identify, regardless of
whether the issue involves a judge or a jury.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 Sci. 453, 453 (1981) (“Rational choice requires that the preference
between options should not reverse with changes of frame. Because of
imperfections of human perception and decision, however, changes of
perspective often reverse the relative apparent size of objects and the
relative desirability of options.”).
161. The representativeness heuristic is “reliance on the degree of apparent
similarity between the features of the events to the features of the
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Hastie and Viscusi have also found evidence that judges are subject to
the hindsight bias. 164 And in a different study, Guthrie, Rachlinski,
and Wistrich found that judges, like most everyone else, tend to jump
to conclusions without adequate reflection. 165 As these authors
observed, “intuition is generally more likely than deliberation to lead
judges astray.” 166 What is the impact of judges’ bounded rationality
when they are called upon to rule upon the allegations of scienter in
rule 10b-5 cases?
2.

The Impact of Decisional Heuristics and Biases

Different heuristics and biases in different contexts will nudge
decision making in different directions. As it happens, most of the

category in judging whether an event is a member of a particular
category.” Rachlinski, supra note 160, at 82. It causes problems
“because people tend to rely on the representativeness heuristic to the
exclusion of other information relevant to categorical judgments,” such
as base rate information. Id. at 83. Judges are subject to the
representative heuristic. See id. at 101 (gathering evidence suggesting
that judges often fall prey to the representativeness heuristic).
162. The egocentric bias is another term for overconfidence; judges manifest
it in various ways, including by being poorly calibrated regarding their
chances of being overturned on appeal. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 814 (2001) [hereinafter
Guthrie et al, Judicial Mind] ; see also Chris Guthrie et al., The
“Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch
Justice, 58 Duke L.J. 1477, 1518–20 (2009) (finding substantial
evidence of judges’ overconfidence in their judging abilities).
163. The hindsight bias is the tendency to conclude that things that have
happened were more foreseeable than they actually were. See Guthrie et
al., Judicial Mind, supra note 162, at 784 (finding evidence of hindsight
bias in an empirical study of judicial decision making); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. Rev.
1227, 1229–30 (2006) (finding conflicting evidence on the extent of the
hindsight bias).
164. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The
Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901, 917
(1998) (finding “massive hindsight bias” by jurors and lesser but still
substantial hindsight bias by judges).
165. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 17, 27–28 (2007) (“[T]hese results
suggest that judges tended to favor intuitive rather than deliberative
faculties. . . . When awarding damages, assessing liability based on
statistical evidence, and predicting outcomes on appeal, judges seemed
inclined to make intuitive judgments.”).
166. Id. at 5; see also id. at 29 (“[A]n excessive reliance on intuition will lead
to erroneous judicial decisions.”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 160,
at 1124 (arguing that intuitive thinking can “lead to severe and
systematic errors”).
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relevant heuristics and biases in the current context will probably
benefit securities fraud defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs.
a.

Overconfidence

People’s minds are “overconfidence machine[s].” 167 In impossibly
high percentages, most people believe that they are above-average
drivers, 168 above-average auditors, 169 above-average eyewitnesses, 170
and pretty much above-average everything else. People chronically
overestimate their own knowledge and ability to make accurate
judgments. 171
To the extent that judges are affected by the overconfidence bias,
and they are, 172 granting them excessive discretion to dispose of cases
at the pleading stage could be detrimental to a search for justice. 173 It

167. David Brooks, The Social Animal 218 (2011).
168. See Risto Näätänen & Heikki Summala, Road-User Behavior
and Traffic Accidents 237 (1976) (concluding that road users give
safety concerns too little attention when considering high-risk driving
behaviors); Caroline E. Preston & Stanley Harris, Psychology of Drivers
in Traffic Accidents, 49 J. Applied Psychol. 284, 286 (1965)
(discussing results of questionnaires where drivers with and without
accident histories all rated themselves closer to expert than poor); Ola
Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow
Drivers? 47 ACTA Psychologica 143 (1981) (discussing driver bias
in an experiment where drivers judged themselves safer and more skillful
than the average driver).
169. See Jane Kennedy & Mark E. Peecher, Judging Auditors’ Technical
Knowledge, 35 J. Acct. Res. 279 (1997) (concluding from an empirical
study that auditors are overconfident in their own abilities).
170. See John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent
Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20
Law & Hum. Behav. 629, 650 (1996) (finding that overconfidence, but
not accuracy, rises with repeated questioning).
171. See Lyle A. Brenner et al., Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency
Judgments: A Critical Examination, 65 Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 212, 218 (1996) (reporting study finding
overconfidence as well as poor use of base-rate information and
vulnerability to representativeness heuristic). Will Rogers has been
famously quoted as saying, “It’s not what we don’t know that gives us
trouble. It’s what we know that ain’t so.” Hillel J. Einhorn,
Overconfidence in Judgment, in 4 New Directions for
Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science 1, 14 (Richard
A. Shweder ed., 1980).
172. See JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and
Comparability Review, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 251, 296 (2003) (explaining
why “overconfidence may be a particular problem with federal appeals
courts”).
173. See Piero Calamandrei, Eulogy of Judges 21 (John Clarke Adams
& C. Abbott Phillips, Jr. trans., 1942) (“I fear the judge who is too sure
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will tend to cause judges to conclude that they can with some
measure of prescience predict more accurately than is actually the
case whether plaintiffs, if given the opportunity to engage in
discovery, could find evidence supporting their scienter allegations. 174
b.

Self-Serving Bias

One of the most influential of the heuristics and biases is the selfserving bias, the tendency people have to gather information, process
information, and even remember information in such a manner as to
advance their own self-interests or their own preexisting views.
Top Enron executives were paid huge bonuses based on projected
profits in deals they put together. Psychological studies show that
they were prone to seek out information that would support the
highest plausible valuations. 175 This is called the confirmation bias, 176
and it accounts for people with conservative political views being
more likely to watch Fox News while liberals are more likely to watch
MSNBC. 177
The self-serving bias also affects how people process information.
Thus, supporters of competing political candidates watching the same
of himself, who reaches his decision quickly, jumping immediately to
conclusions without deliberation or repentance.”).
174. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of
Prejudgment, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 413, 428 (2011) (“Overconfidence in
judgment can lead judges to believe that they have more ability to
predict the course of a lawsuit than is actually the case.”).
175. See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 Am. Bus.
L.J. 417, 419–21, 428 (2003) (discussing how the difficulty in valuing
commodities and the incentive to set favorable prices led to a selfserving bias and the acceptance of questionable valuations that
contributed to higher earnings and bonuses at Enron) (citing Brian
Cruver, Anatomy of Greed 80 (2002)).
176. The confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out information that
supports a hypothesis and to ignore or downplay conflicting information.
See Mark W. Dirsmith et al., Of Paradigms and Metaphors in Auditing
Thought, 2 Contemp. Acct. Res. 46, 56–57 (1985) (noting the
irrational use of information by organizations (citing Henry Mintzberg
et al., The Structure of “Unstructured” Decision Processes, 21 Admin.
Sci. Q. 246 (1976))). This is particularly the case when the hypothesis
is one already adopted by a person or that is consistent with the
person’s self-interest. See Scott Plous, The Psychology of
Judgment and Decision Making 231–34, 238–40 (1993) (finding
extensive evidence of self-fulfilling prophesies and confirmation bias
among both men and women in a variety of scenarios).
177. See Drew Westen, The Political Brain, at xiv, 100 (2007) (noting
that the pleasure centers of people’s brains light up when they find
information supporting their preexisting beliefs); see also id. at 100
(neuroimaging suggests that “our brains have a remarkable capacity to find
their way toward convenient truths—even if they’re not all that true”).
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debate each tend to conclude that “their guy” won. 178 A study showed
that when a group favoring capital punishment and a group against
capital punishment were each shown the same document with
arguments for and against capital punishment, members of both
groups tended to construe the document as favoring their
diametrically opposed positions and, indeed, felt more fervently about
their point of view after reading the document than before. 179
The self-serving bias even affects how people remember
information. 180 Studies show people are more likely to recall evidence
that supports their own point of view than evidence that opposes it. 181
Because of the self-serving bias, doctors who own stakes in testing
labs order significantly more tests than doctors who do not. 182 And
studies show that even auditors—who are trained to be independent,
analytical, and skeptical—are strongly affected by the self-serving
bias. 183
178. See, e.g., Robert P. Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon:
Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the
Beirut Massacre, 49 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 577 (1985)
(showing that opposing groups on the political spectrum each thought
that the media had been biased in favor of their opponent). And fans of
opposing football teams who each watch a tape of the game are likely to
think that the other team made the largest number of flagrantly
inappropriate plays. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, Case
Report, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. Abnormal & Soc.
Psychol. 129, 131 (1954) (finding considerable bias among students in
evaluations of opposing college football teams after a game between
Dartmouth and Princeton).
179. Westen, supra note 177, at 101.
180. See Trivers, supra note 158, at 25 (noting how self-interest causes us
to “continually create false personal narratives”).
181. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol.
Bull. 480, 483 (1990) (discussing how people are subject to motivated
reasoning, but cannot just believe anything, so under the “illusion of
objectivity” they search their memories in a selective fashion to
construct justifications for their desired conclusions).
182. See Margaret Heffernan, Willful Blindness 185 (2011) (interviewing physician David Ring, an orthopedic surgeon at a major
American hospital, on the effects of money on the medical profession).
183. See C. Bryan Cloyd & Brian C. Spilker, The Influence of Client
Preferences on Tax Professionals’ Search for Judicial Precedents,
Subsequent Judgments and Recommendations, 74 Acct. Rev. 299, 301
(1999) (finding that after studying certain provided precedents, one-half
of accountant subjects recommended a position known to be favored by
their clients, even though a panel of experts concluded that there was
only a 14% chance that the position would be sustained if litigated);
Andrew D. Cuccia, Karl Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson, The Ability of
Professional Standards to Mitigate Aggressive Reporting, 70 Acct.
Rev. 227, 243–44 (1995) (finding self-serving bias in tax context); S.
Salterio & L. Koonce, The Persuasiveness of Audit Evidence: The Case
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The self-serving bias indicates that judges’ holdings will be
influenced by their preexisting political and policy beliefs, and many
empirical studies indicate that this is the case. 184 Judges even
of Accounting Policy Decisions, 22 Acct. Orgs. & Soc’y 573, 585
(1997) (finding that if precedents all point in one direction, the auditor
will go that way, but if precedents conflict auditors will tend strongly to
favor client’s preferred position, and noting that the finding “does
suggest that conflicting precedents provide the basis for the auditor to
side with the client which, in turn, may give the appearance of a lack of
independence”).
184. See, e.g., Eileen Braman, Law, Politics & Perception: How
Policy Preferences Influence Legal Reasoning 5 (2009) (noting
the existence and lack of awareness of judicial bias when judges engage
“in the ‘objective’ consideration of evidence”); Jeffrey A. Segal &
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model 63 (1993) (finding that a judge’s own preferences and the
influence of majoritarian impulses affect judicial decision making); Cass
R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?: An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 45 (2006) (analyzing a large data
set of judicial voting decisions and finding that “ideological voting is
emphatically present”); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J.
Legal Stud. 257 (1995) (studying influence of judges’ attitudes on civil
rights cases); James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern,
60 Ohio St. L.J. 1675, 1761 (1999) (finding “numerous personal,
political, and professional background factors” that affected judges’
decisions in cases involving unions); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998)
(“Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review agency
discretion.”); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1635
(1998) (finding ideological decision making on en banc circuit court
panels); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54
Vand. L. Rev. 71 (2001) (reporting study finding that political
affiliation helped predict votes in labor-management dispute dispositions);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 813 (2008) (finding significant
differences between voting of Republican judges and Democratic judges);
Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ SocioPolitical Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal
Decision Making, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 31, 43–48 (1999) (analyzing
effect of background on judicial bias in death penalty cases); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va.
L. Rev. 1717, 1766 (1997) (finding empirical support for the theory that
“D.C. Circuit judges employ a strategically ideological approach to
judging”); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial
Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in
the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1100 (2001) (providing evidence
linking political affiliation and ideological preferences of judges to judicial
outcomes); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and
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misremember the facts of cases in ways that support their
subconsciously endorsed racial stereotypes. 185
What this means for the current topic is that if judges are
predisposed to believe that federal securities fraud lawsuits are often
frivolous or that it would be irrational for auditors to audit recklessly,
they will tend to unconsciously search through complaints and
supporting documents for information that supports that point of
view, to interpret the arguments and documents to support that point
of view, and even to remember better the arguments and documents
supporting that point as they write their opinions. 186 And that is the
leaning of most federal judges, who “routinely express concern that
securities class actions are often lawyer-driven suits brought in the
hope of settling for their nuisance value.” 187 The more discretion
judges have to dismiss cases early, the more likely they will do so.

Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87
Calif. L. Rev. 1125, 1195 (1999) (finding in empirical study that
decisions about federal preemption in environmental cases are the result of
“actions of (partly) ideologically-motivated federal judges”).
185. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1232 (2009) (finding
that judges “like the rest of us, possess implicit [racial] biases” but that
they mostly managed to avoid their influence “when they were told of
the defendant’s race” and actively guarded against their own
prejudices).
186. Judges may well suffer from the same phenomenon that affected Carne
Ross, one of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s underlings as the Iraq War
began. Ross later admitted:
The speeches I drafted for the Security Council and my
telegrams back to London were composed of facts filtered from
the stacks of reports and intelligence that daily hit my desk. As
I read these reports, facts and judgments that contradicted “our”
version of events would almost literally fade into nothingness.
Facts that reinforced our narrative would stand out to me
almost as if highlighted, to be later deployed by me, my
ambassador and my ministers like hand grenades in the
diplomatic trench warfare. Details in otherwise complex reports
would be extracted to be telegraphed back to London, where
they would be inserted into ministerial briefings or press articles.
A complicated picture was reduced to a selection of facts that
became factoids, such as the suggestion that Hussein imported
huge quantities of whisky or built a dozen palaces, validated by
constant repetition: true, but not the whole truth.
Carne Ross, War Stories, Fin. Times, Jan. 29–30, 2005, at 21, 22
(emphasis added).
187. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773, 782
(2004).
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The increasing conservatism of the federal bench exacerbates this
effect. 188
c.

Hindsight Bias and Fraud-by-Hindsight Doctrine

The hindsight bias is the tendency to regard things that have
occurred as having been relatively predictable and obvious. 189 Once
people know of an outcome, they tend to systematically overestimate
the likelihood that they could have anticipated that outcome in
advance. The hindsight bias is exacerbated by the curse of knowledge
effect (the difficulty people have in ignoring information that they
have learned when they make decisions) 190 and the outcome bias (the
tendency people have to judge a decision’s quality by its outcome). 191
188. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in
Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16
Comm. L. & Pol’y 349, 378 (2011) (noting increasing conservatism of
federal judges); Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public
Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 603, 607 (2009) (same).
189. Baruch Fischhoff is one of the first to have studied the hindsight bias,
which he described as follows:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have
been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what
has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as
having appeared “relatively inevitable” before it happened.
People believe that others should have been able to anticipate
events much better than was actually the case.
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics
and Biases in Hindsight, in Judgment Under Uncertainty 335, 341
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); see also
Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen”
Remembered Probabilities of Once–Future Things, 13 Organizational
Behav. & Hum. Performance 1, 3 (1975) (“[T]he remembered or
reconstructed probability of an event will tend to be larger than the
probability originally assigned to it if the event is believed to have
occurred.”); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased
Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107
Psychol. Bull. 311, 323 (1990) (“[R]esearch and theory on hindsight
phenomena suggest that the decision maker is unlikely to even be aware
of the influence of the to-be-disregarded information, much less able to
undo its effects.”).
190. See, e.g., Jane Kennedy, Debiasing the Curse of Knowledge in Audit
Judgment, 70 Acct. Rev. 249, 266–67 (1995) (finding significant curse
of knowledge effects among auditors and testing methods of mitigating
the effects).
191. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision
Evaluation, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Pscyhol. 569, 570 (1988)
(explaining that an outcome bias exists when “people take outcomes
into account in a way that is irrelevant to the true quality of the
decision”).
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The hindsight bias is one of the most reliably replicated biases in
existence, 192 and there is little evidence that we can free judges or
jurors from the effects of the bias simply by educating them regarding
its existence and impact. 193 Most people, including when they act as
jurors, are subject to the hindsight bias. 194
In general, the hindsight bias “makes defendants appear more
culpable than they really are.” 195 If an auditor did not see something
coming, but a judge pursuant to the hindsight bias concludes that he
or she would have seen it coming and therefore that the auditor
should have as well, the judge will be more likely to find recklessness
where an innocent mistake occurred than if the hindsight bias did not
exist. 196 And there is evidence that auditor defendants may suffer at
the hands of this bias. 197
But while the hindsight bias will disadvantage defendants if
courts do not compensate for it, in the context of securities fraud class
actions there is substantial empirical evidence that courts have
compensated. In fact, they have overcompensated. In 1978, Judge
Henry Friendly promulgated the “fraud by hindsight” (FBH)
doctrine, ruling that a complaint that does nothing more than allege
192. See Rachlinski, supra note 160, at 67 (“Every published empirical test
of the hindsight bias replicates the phenomenon.”).
193. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 603 (1998) (“Psychologists have
uncovered no way to instruct people on how to evaluate decisions in
hindsight in a way that completely avoids the hindsight bias.”).
194. See Lee J. Gilbertson, et al., A Study of Hindsight Bias: The Rodney
King Case in Retrospect, 74 Psychol. Rep. 383, 383–84 (1994)
(studying verdict in first Rodney King case); Hastie & Viscusi, supra
note 164, at 917 (“[D]ecisions involving evaluations of risk, especially
where the judgment requires the decision maker to infer ex ante risk
estimates from an ex post perspective, the typical juror appears to be
subject to a massive hindsight bias.”); see also Wray Herbert, On
Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind’s Hard-Wired Habits
47–48 (2010) (explaining the bias and giving examples).
195. Rachlinski, supra note 193, at 572.
196. See Donald C. Langevoort, Lecture, The Epistemology of CorporateSecurities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63
Brook. L. Rev. 629, 662 (1997) (noting that the potential for
hindsight bias in securities fraud cases is “severe”).
197. See John C. Anderson et al., The Presence of Hindsight Bias in Peer
and Judicial Evaluation in Public Accounting Litigation, 28 Tort &
Ins. L.J. 461 (1993) (comparing hindsight bias in auditor cases to other
settings); Marianne M. Jennings et al., Causality as an Influence on
Hindsight Bias: An Empirical Examination of Judges’ Evaluation of
Professional Audit Judgment, 21 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y. 143, 161
(1998) (finding that the impact of hindsight bias on judges evaluating
causation is stronger in some situations than in others).
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fraud by hindsight will not pass muster. 198 Judge Easterbrook then
popularized the doctrine in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young 199 in 1990,
leading it to be cited in nearly one-third of all published rule 10b-5
class action opinions 200 and creating “a hurdle that plaintiffs in
securities cases must overcome.” 201
In an impressive study, Gulati, Rachlinski, and Langevoort studied a
large number of these cases. On the one hand, it might appear that the
FBH doctrine is the courts’ way of neutralizing the prejudicial effects of
the hindsight bias. But upon further contemplation, the authors
suspected that it might actually be a means of disposing of cases quickly
to manage dockets. They developed various markers and tested them
empirically. All the evidence pointed to judges using the FBH doctrine to
manage their dockets rather than to compensate for the adverse effects of
the hindsight bias:
[O]ur analysis reveals that the FBH doctrine is not an effort to
control the influence of the hindsight bias in securities litigation,
but is part of an effort to manage securities cases. Although case
management can take many forms, from limiting discovery to
facilitating settlement, in this context, judges are seeking to
manage securities cases through a thinly disguised effort to
screen securities cases at an early stage of the proceedings. 202

Part of the evidence of the prodefendant application of the FBH
doctrine is that it is used almost exclusively in situations where the
hindsight bias might benefit plaintiffs and almost never in situations
where the bias might benefit defendants. 203 In the study’s sample of
cases, defendants won 70% of the time when the FBH was mentioned,
versus only 47% of the time when it was not. 204 The authors
concluded:
What is clear . . . is that judges are actively managing the entry
and exit of cases at the pleading stage. In a sense, then, the
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards and the FBH doctrine
are not just about raising the bar to entry into court, but also

198. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978).
199. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990).
200. Gulati et al., supra note 187, at 775.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 776–77 (footnote omitted).
203. See id. at 777 (“[E]ven though the hindsight bias can benefit or harm a
plaintiff’s case, judges selectively target the FBH doctrine at instances
in which the doctrine benefits plaintiffs.”).
204. See id. at 804 (noting that this difference was statistically significant).
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about granting the judges more discretion in deciding who gains
entry and who does not. 205
d.

Fundamental Attribution Error and Motivated Exculpation

If there is one overarching finding from psychological research
over the past several decades, it is that the situational tends to
dominate the dispositional. 206 In other words, people’s decision making
is heavily influenced by the context in which they make decisions.
They don’t automatically make good decisions because they are good
people or bad decisions because they are bad people. Rather, good
people too often make bad decisions because of social or
organizational pressures. 207
But most people are not aware of the influence of these contextual
factors and tend to attribute others’ actions to their character, not to
situational influences. 208 “When observers draw inferences on the
causes of another’s behavior, they systematically fail to take into
account situational factors.” 209 This is called the fundamental
205. Id. at 822.
206. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1103 (2000) (“[D]espite rational choice theory’s
implicit prediction to the contrary, context matters in decision making.”);
Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Two Social Psychologists’ Reflections on
Situationism and the Criminal Justice System, in Ideology,
Psychology, and Law 612, 613 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) (“[W]hen
people are called upon to evaluate or predict the behavior of others, they
tend to underestimate the impact of situational or environmental factors
and to overestimate the impact of dispositional ones.”).
207. See, e.g., Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A
View from the Trenches, 37 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 8, 8 (1995) (finding
that freshly-minted Harvard MBAs often felt “strong organizational
pressures” to act unethically).
208. For example, when people read an essay written by another person, they
tend to attribute that position to the author even after being informed
that the author was forced to take that position. See Edward E. Jones &
Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. Experimental
Soc. Psychol. 1 (1967) (finding a tendency to attribute attitudes to
behavior even in no-choice situations); see also Kenworthey Bilz &
Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 50 Psychology of
Learning and Motivation: Moral Judgment and Decision
Making 101, 104 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009) (“[T]he cognitive
processes of actors are opaque but their behavior is apparent, and so
people assume that the obvious explanation (people behave the way
they do because that is the kind of people they are) governs, and they
shape their own behavior and beliefs accordingly.”).
209. Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 222 (citing Lee Ross & Richard E.
Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social
Psychology 125–34 (1991)).
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attribution error and it interacts with the hindsight bias to cause
people to conclude not only that people should have made different
judgments than they did but also that they made the wrong decision
for bad reasons, not because situational factors impacted their
decisions. Yet situational factors do tend to exert pervasive influence
upon human decision making. 210
The fundamental attribution error is extremely persistent, 211 and
in the present context it can cause judges and jurors to conclude
erroneously that a 10b-5 defendant acted with fraudulent intent. 212
How does this happen, even to intelligent and educated judges? 213
210. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
1110, 1123 (2006) (book review) (“[S]ocial psychologists have shown that
social influences often amplify cognitive errors.”).
In contrast, when people judge their own behavior, they do not
hesitate to take situational factors into account. See Hogarth, supra
note 78, at 154 (“In other words, [we tend to believe that] personality
drives the behavior of others, but situation drives our own.”). For that
reason, people ascribe less variability to others’ behavior than to their
own. See Plous, supra note 176, at 186–87 (citing studies).
Another factor relevant to scienter is the tendency of people to judge
the same behavior as more intentional and therefore more deserving of
severe punishment when it will be performed in the future than when it
has been performed in the past. See Zachary C. Burns et al., Predicting
Premeditation: Future Behavior Is Seen as More Intentional than Past
Behavior 3 (July 5, 2011), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1879558.
211. See Plous, supra note 176, at 180–81 (describing studies where people
not only attributed helping behavior to others’ religiosity, consistent
with the fundamental attribution error, but continued to do so even
after reading a study that found no such connection).
212. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological
Perspective, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 529, 545 (2005) (noting that the
adjudicative process, by placing the individual front and center,
arguably “induces courts to attribute too much blame to individuals and
not enough to social forces”). Quintanilla lauds the Tellabs decision as
helping to mitigate the fundamental attribution error by requiring
judges and juries to compare and contrast culpable and nonculpable
alternatives. See Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 209–10.
213. One of the nation’s best minds and most prominent judges, Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, demonstrated the fundamental
attribution error, as well as overconfidence, the self-serving bias, and
arguably several other cognitive biases when he argued that the lawand-economics movement was winnings hearts and minds because it was
free of political biases, whereas competing theories were completely
driven by political views. See Richard A. Posner, The Sociology of the
Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 265,
274 (1995) (“Economic theory itself (including the application of the
theory to law), at least when employed for positive rather than
normative analysis, has no political variance.”). In other words, Posner
concluded that people who agreed with him were right because they
were not political whereas people who disagreed with him were wrong
because they were political. While this argument is often heard on Fox
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Quattrone noted that people have two judgment systems working at
the same time when they make decisions. “System I” processes are
spontaneous and intuitive. They are automatic and rely heavily upon
heuristics, some of which are discussed in this paper. “System II” is
more deliberative, requiring effort and concentration. 214 This model
was initially developed by Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick. 215
Quattrone developed a model of the mental processes behind the
Fundamental Attribution Error based on the finding that people tend
to spontaneously (using System I) attribute a connection between
another’s dispositions and their behavior. 216 To take another step and
News and MSNBC, it does not deserve much credit, especially given
studies showing that conservatives are more rigidly ideological than
liberals. See John T. Jost et al., Exceptions that Prove the Rule—Using
a Theory of Motivated Social Cognition to Account for Ideological
Incongruities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas
(2003), 129 Psychol. Bull. 383, 390 (2003) (“[A]ll 13 studies provided
at least some evidence for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis.”).
Posner’s various versions of it have been strongly criticized. See Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep
Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 139 (2003) (“[M]any of the most
prominent legal scholars actively reject the tenets of law and
economics.”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character:
A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1,
79 (2004) (“Posner does more than just selectively reinterpret evidence
to corroborate a favored theory. He also fundamentally adjusts the
underlying theory, while falsely claiming that its pre-altered version has
been confirmed.”). Empirical evidence and a little reflection make it
obvious that the model “rational economic man” that lies at the heart of
the law and economics movement is not an apolitical fact but an
ideology. Barry Schwartz, Crowding Out Morality: How the Ideology of
Self-Interest Can Be Self-Fulfilling, in Ideology, Psychology, and
Law 160, 181 (Jon Hanson, ed. 2012) (“‘Rational economic man’ as a
reflection of human nature is a fiction—an ideology.”).
214. See Guthrie et al., supra note 165, at 7–9 (explaining that System I
processes occur spontaneously and do not consume much attention,
while System II processes involve complex thought that assesses the
quality of such intuition).
215. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Heuristics and
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49, 51–60
(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002)
(adopting the labels of “System 1” and “System 2” for their dual-process
theory of cognitive processes). For more detail on System I and System
II thinking, see generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and
Slow (2011) and Keith E. Stanovich, Who Is Rational? (1999).
216. See George A. Quattrone, Overattribution and Unit Formation: When
Behavior Engulfs the Person, 42 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol.
593, 607 (1982) (finding this overattribution may “reflect a mixture of
unit formation and insufficient adjustment”).
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consider the situational factors surrounding the other’s decision is
effortful, 217 so System II may not kick in. 218 Gilbert found that people
“tend to draw [System I] dispositional inferences, even when they are
informed that behavior is linked to situational factors.” 219
The Fundamental Attribution Error leads people to tend to
conclude that because X did a bad thing, X must be a bad person.
Having evidence only of the bad act, and tending to ignore situational
factors that may have affected X’s decisions, people will tend to
conclude that X’s bad acts are representative of X’s character. But
when people believe that they know something about X’s character
and are not relying solely upon X’s actions to draw inferences about
X’s character, a different dynamic results that, interestingly, may in
the present setting push judges in a prodefendant direction.
Most courts presume that accountants would not do anything to
endanger their reputations. 220 The announced reason for this is a
straightforward presumption of economic rationality—auditors’ reputations are the key to their prosperity and it would not be rational for
them to recklessly aid their clients’ fraud and therefore undermine that
reputation. 221 As indicated elsewhere in this Article, there are pervasive
reasons to doubt this theory. First, most people are at best boundedly
rational, and that includes auditors. 222 Second, there is sufficient
empirical evidence of auditor misconduct to persuasively rebut this
presumption as it applies to auditors of public companies specifically. 223
217. According to Fritz Heider, “behavior . . . engulf[s] the total field,”
meaning that when we view others their behavior is the most salient
thing we perceive, while situational factors tend to be in the
background. Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal
Relations 54 (1958).
218. Id. at 35, 53–54.
219. Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 223 (citing Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary
Personology, in 2 The Handbook of Social Psychology 89, 112
(Daniel T. Gilbert et. al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)).
220. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
221. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
222. See supra notes 157–66 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. See also Kahn & Lawson,
supra note 67, at 404–05:
[T]here are many reasons to doubt the extent to which auditors
will always, or even often, find it in their own best interests to
challenge management. First, the financial benefits of complicity
with management, in the form of audit fees, future engagements,
favorable recommendations, and the like, are tangible and
concrete, while the costs in terms of lost reputation are remote,
speculative, and uncertain . . . . Second, the incentives of the
individual auditors reinforce the perverse incentives faced by
their audit firms as a whole . . . . Third, auditors are subject to
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It may be simple intellectual laziness that induces judges to
continue this presumption in face of so much contrary evidence, but it
is also quite possible that more is at work here. Whereas stereotypes
of attorneys tend to paint them as slimy and immoral, 224 stereotypes
of accountants picture them, at worst, as boring and timid. 225 Immoral
and dishonest character is not a part of society’s default vision of
accountants. Indeed, in recent movies accountants are most
commonly portrayed as heroes. 226
To the extent that judges presume that accountants generally
have good character, they will have a tendency to find that whatever
bad acts they are associated with were not performed intentionally.
Whereas the law formally holds that a defendant’s character should
have little to do with any legal conclusions regarding motive,

many of the same cognitive biases that plague all people, and
many of those biases work in favor of complicity with
management . . . . Fourth, and most importantly, it is hard to
dispute the evidence of what actually happens.
224. See Lawrence S. Krieger, Human Nature As a New Guiding Philosophy
for Legal Education and the Profession, 47 Washburn L.J. 247, 267
(2008) (noting the dishonest-lawyer stereotype); Maury Landsman &
Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students Across Three
Years: Influences of Gender, Political Ideology and Interest in Altruistic
Law Practice, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 891, 904 (2004) (referencing the
“unethical lawyer” stereotype); Ruth E. Piller, Editorial, Professional
Courtesy Does Not Refer to the Marine Kingdom, 40 Hous. Law.,
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 10 (noting that “lawyers are often equated with
flesh eating fish and used car salesmen”); Kenneth Ward, Alexander
Bickel’s Theory of Judicial Review Reconsidered, 28 Ariz. St. L.J.
893, 923 n.164 (1996) (noting “sleazy lawyer” stereotype); John
Leubsdorf, Comment, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 Ariz. L. Rev.
453, 456 (1997) (referring to the “greedy lawyer stereotype”).
225. As the vocational guidance counselor said in Monty Python’s And
Now for Something Completely Different (Columbia Pictures
1971): “Our experts describe you as an appallingly dull fellow,
unimaginative, timid, spineless, easily dominated, no sense of humor,
tedious company, and irrepressibly drab and awful. And whereas in
most professions these would be considerable drawbacks, in
accountancy, they are a positive boon.” See also Howard Darmstadter,
Explaining with Examples, 10 Scribes J. Legal Writing 137, 141
(2005–2006) (noting that accountants are stereotyped as “dull, dry,
meticulous bean counters”); Ian E. Scott, Note, Fair Value Accounting:
Friend or Foe, 1 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 489, 541 (2010) (noting
that an accountant “is stereotypically rigid, rule-based, bookish, and has
his calculator ready”).
226. Tony Dimnik & Sandra Felton, Accountant Stereotypes in Movies
Distributed in North America in the Twentieth Century, 31 Acct. Org.
& Soc’y 129, 129 (2006) (“Characters with CPAs or CAs are more
likely to be Heroes than any other stereotype.”).
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intentionality, or ultimate blameworthiness, 227 blaming is a social
process and it is heavily influenced by psychological factors. 228
In two recent articles, 229 one with Mary-Hunter McDonnell,
Professor Janice Nadler has reported a series of experiments
indicating that judgments regarding moral character affect people’s
attributions of motive and intentionality. In other words, if people
believe that Joe is a bad person, they will believe that he is acting
with more intentionality than if they see Joe perform the exact same
acts in the exact same context but believe that he is a good person.
In a series of three experiments they performed providing evidence
of a process they call motivated inculpation, Nadler and McDonnell
reported experiments producing
evidence that when people judge a harmful action performed by
a bad person or performed with a bad motive, they are more
likely to perceive that person as more responsible, and the act
as more causal and intentional, than when they judge an
identical harmful action performed by a good person or
performed with a good motive. 230

For current purposes, it is important to note that the process
works both ways. In other words, there is also motivated exculpation.
If people see a defendant as “good,” they are generally motivated to
interpret the defendant’s wrongdoing as less intentional and less
blameworthy. 231
In a second set of experiments, Nadler explored the mechanism
behind motivated inculpation. Again, her experiments supported the
conclusion that “psychological blame is influenced by perceptions of
the actor’s overall virtue or lack thereof, even apart from the actor’s
reason for acting in the specific instance.” 232 At least part of the
227. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or character
trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character or trait.”).
228. See Charles Tilly, Credit and Blame 4 (2008) (“[C]rediting and
blaming are fundamentally social acts.”).
229. Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character
and Moral Emotion on Blame, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2012);
Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and
the Psychology of Blame, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 255, 273 (2012).
230. Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 229, at 258 (emphasis added).
231. Nadler and McDonnel’s three experiments demonstrated that people
interpret certain transgressions as less legally blameworthy when they find
the person responsible and likeable. Thus, in a hypothetical where a
trailer fire killed two firefighters, a defendant who used the trailer to store
fertilizer for his exotic orchids was found less blameworthy than one who
used it to manufacture methamphetamines. Id. at 276, 283, 291.
232. Nadler, supra note 229, at 2.
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mechanism at work stems from moral emotions that people feel. 233
Nadler proposed that “compared to an otherwise virtuous person who
causes harm, an otherwise bad person who causes harm makes us feel
angrier and more disgusted, which in turn leads to more punitive
attributions of blame.” 234 Her experiments generally confirmed the
supposition that when an actor’s character is thought to be good,
people will judge him as having acted less intentionally in doing a bad
act than when his character is perceived to be bad (and vice versa, of
course). 235 Overall, “[w]e give the benefit of the doubt to a person
with a virtuous character who causes harm: we perceive his actions as
less intentional and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less
foreseeable than if his character is flawed.” 236
To the extent that courts irrationally credit auditors with being
economically rational and buy into the common stereotype of accountants as boring but generally honest, they may have a tendency to
underestimate the intentionality behind auditors’ acts that contribute to
flawed audits.
C.

Exacerbating Judicial Bias

The conflicting heuristics and biases mentioned above are most
likely to favor defendants in the current context, given the strength of
the self-serving bias, the vigor with which courts apply the FBH
doctrine, the impact of moral exculpation, the current conservatism of
the federal judiciary, and the foundational (and erroneous) operative
233. See generally, Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding
Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom 20–22, 50–51, 54–55 (2006)
(emotions play a significant role in guiding people to moral conclusions).
Among the most important morality-tinged emotions are guilt, shame,
anger, and disgust. Id.
234. Nadler, supra note 229, at 4. Nadler cites work by Mark D. Alicke also
supporting the view that people’s initial emotional reactions to a harm
situation directly affect perceptions of harm and intent. See generally,
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126
Psychol. Bull. 556, 557–558 (2000) (“[T]he culpable control model
. . . emphasize[s] that personal control judgments and blame attributions
are influenced by relatively unconscious, spontaneous evaluations of the
mental, behavioral, and consequence elements”).
235. Nadler’s experiment had participants read vignettes to assess the
blameworthiness of “Nathan,” who accidentally kills another man in a
skiing accident. Certain participants read about “good Nathan,” who
was a responsible worker and volunteer, and others “bad Nathan,” who
was an irresponsible worker. When Nathan’s moral character was “bad,”
he was seen as having acted more intentionally and was thus more
blameworthy than “good Nathan.” See Nadler, supra note 229, at 16–27
(describing the design of the experiment and its results). The effect
disappeared if study participants were asked to make judgments about
both “good Nathan” and “bad Nathan” side by side. Id. at 25.
236. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
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assumption that auditors would not sacrifice their reputations just to
please a client and therefore deserve a special level of protection in
10b-5 scienter pleading. Professor Bone has argued that given judges’
bounded rationality, it is not necessarily a good idea to give courts
significant discretion. 237 The key point to stress is not so much which
side is favored by judges’ unconscious biases, but the fact that
whatever prejudices are in play are exacerbated by both the structure
of the decision making process and the vagueness of the law that we
document.
First, Rachlinski recently pointed out that the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal require judges to decide cases
based largely upon their first impression of the lawsuit without
knowing which facts discovery will uncover. 238 This “encourages
judges to rely too heavily on their intuition, elevates the importance
of potentially misleading pleading practices, and encourages
overconfidence among judges.” 239 The PSLRA preceded Ashcroft and
Twombly in encouraging judges to resolve rule 10b-5 cases before
discovery, intensifying the impact of judges’ psychological biases and
cognitive distortions.
Second, the current muddled state of the law exacerbates
whatever prejudices happen to apply whereas an ideal legal regime
would instead minimize them. As Droske has pointed out, confusion
or ambiguity in a doctrine increases the likelihood that the selfserving bias and other behavioral and cognitive effects will lead to
judges following their own preferences:
The lack of clarity with respect to whether statutory language is
ambiguous provides judges an opportunity to exercise discretion
so as to maximize their own personal political preferences.
Professors Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller documented
this phenomenon in an essay that empirically showed that
judges selectively employed the Chevron doctrine—only
triggered in cases of statutory ambiguity—so that cases would
come out in accord with their political preferences. 240

237. See Bone, supra note 153, at 2023 (“The naïve assumption that trial
judges have the institutional expertise and experience to exercise
discretion well ignores serious and unavoidable bounded rationality,
information access, and strategic interaction obstacles that impair the
quality of case-specific decision-making.”).
238. See Rachlinski, supra note 174, at 413 (“The new pleading standard
that the Court has articulated forces judges to rely on their first
impressions of a lawsuit. Judges must imagine the course of the lawsuit
without knowing what facts discovery will uncover.”).
239. Id. at 414.
240. Timothy J. Droske, Congressional Polarization Due to Maximizing
Political Satisfaction: Why Elhauge’s Current Enactable Preferences
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Legal indeterminacy fosters unfettered judicial discretion which,
in turn, creates more likelihood for judgment error. 241 Discretion has
advantages, but should never be unconstrained. 242 Decisionmakers are
more likely to be influenced by factors that they themselves view as
unjustifiable, when a situation is elastic and there is more wiggle room
to choose an outcome. 243 Judicial discretion, while absolutely
necessary in some measure, also embodies the “right to be wrong.” 244

Conclusion
Pleading rules are of central concern to securities antifraud
litigation. “Determining who is allowed to invoke the machinery of
the civil justice system, and under what circumstances they may do

Default Rule Fails to Avoid the Congressional Deadlock and
Polarization That Stems From Expansionist Statutory Interpretation,
102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 176, 185 (2008) (citing Cross & Tiller,
supra note 184, at 2169).
241. See Guthrie et al., supra note 165, at 24 (referencing the hindsight bias
specifically); Chunlin Leonhard, A Legal Chameleon: An Examination of
the Doctrine of Good Faith in Chinese and American Contract Law, 25
Conn. J. Int’l L. 305, 311 (2010) (noting that legal vagueness invites
broad judicial discretion); Mary Liston, Witnessing Arbitrariness:
Roncarelli v. Duplessis Fifty Years On, 55 McGill L.J. 689, 713
(2010) (“Legal indeterminacy, uncertainty, gaps, and vagueness
exacerbate the risks of judicial discretion . . . .”); Francis Barry
McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental
Rights, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 975, 1022 (1988) (noting that vague laws
create the problem of extensive judicial discretion); Paul L. Smith, The
Primary Caretaker Presumption: Have We Been Presuming Too Much?,
75 Ind. L.J. 731, 742 (2000) (vague legal doctrine leads to “unfettered
judicial discretion” (quoting Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A
Feminist Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody
Cases, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 291, 293 (1992))).
242. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31–39
(1978) (noting that, while judicial discretion is useful when laws are
vague or have not been established, there must be standards that
determine when judicial discretion may overrule, alter, or establish rules
of law).
243. See Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 229, at 270 (“We are also
influenced by factors that we ourselves regard as unjustifiable, though
we may not be aware of such influence. This is especially true when the
legitimate evidence is ‘elastic’—that is, when there is more wiggle room
to come out either way in their conclusion.” (footnote omitted)).
244. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 637 (1971). And substantive
discretion, which is what is at stake here, is more worrisome than
procedural discretion. See Marcus, supra note 153, at 1605.
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so, lies at the core of how a system of law defines itself.” 245
Extraordinarily high stakes are involved when rule 10b-5 class action
litigation is filed, so it is important to get it right, and it appears that
we are not getting it right. Part I of this Article contains a doctrinal
analysis that indicates that both general rules of pleading scienter in
auditor fraud cases and the practical application of those rules are
hopelessly muddled. Part II confirmed this conclusion through
empirical study, demonstrating with some rigor that neither plaintiffs
nor defendants can predict with any certainty how courts will react to
specific factual allegations of auditor scienter in any given case. This
is unlikely to be a satisfactory state of affairs, and Part III used the
insights of behavioral psychology and related fields to explain why
significant doctrinal ambiguity tends to create excessive judicial
discretion which, in turn, is a recipe for bias that can disadvantage
both plaintiffs and defendants. In the current state of affairs, it seems
more likely that plaintiffs will be disadvantaged, but whatever the
direction of bias, unfettered discretion is likely to lead to more judicial
errors of judgment than would occur under a regime of clearer and
more settled law. 246

245. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading—Why Now?, 114 Penn
St. L. Rev. 1247, 1247 (2010).
246. Spelling out such a clearer state of the law is a task beyond the scope of
this Article, but others have tried, and their efforts deserve some
consideration. See, e.g., Olazábal & Abril, supra note 3, at 440.
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